INSURANCE AGAINST LACK OF INSURANCE?
A DISSENT FROM THE UNINSURED
MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT
JOSEPH LAUFER*

Recently the insurance industry has sponsored, on a
nationwide basis, its own solution to the perennialproblem of
the uninsured andfinancially irresponsiblemotorist. It consists
of a policy called the "Uninsured Motorist Endorsement",
designed to protect the insured against the risk of injury by
uninsured and negligent drivers: The policy is sold on either a
compulsory or a more or less automatic basis to holders of
automobile liability insurance policies. The author suggests
that for at least three major reasons the industry's solution is
wanting: (1) the terms of the policy are unduly restrictive, (2)
they give rise to innumerable law suits, despite an unusual
clause compelling the insured victim to arbitratedisputes with
his insurer, and (3) they ignorepedestrian victims who do not
own cars nor share a car-owner's household. The most urgent
rejbrm needed is to extend protection, as New York has done,
to these pedestrian victims. Further,existing inequitable restrictions on recovery should be removed, especially if, as New
York's experience seems to indicate, the Endorsement has
turned out to be a profitableventurefor the industry.

A

85 percent of the more than 83 million passenger automobiles presently in use in the United States are covered by
liability insurance,' most of which is procured voluntarily by
motorists desiring to protect themselves against liability from
traffic accidents. The arrangement serves two major purposes. It
protects the insbred motorist against the depletion of personal
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ITotal 1968 registration of private and commercial automobiles was over 83 million.
U.S. Dep't of Transp., News Release (May 25, 1969). J.C. Bateman, president of the
Insurance Information Institute, estimated that 85% of the cars on the road in 1966 were
insured. The National Underwriter, Sept. 6, 1968, at 13. in that year registered passenger
automobiles totalled 78,315,000. 1967 AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND FIGURES 18. These
figures are based on estimates that may not be up-to-date. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC "VICTIM 65-67 (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON &
O'CONNELL].
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assets which would result if he were forced to pay the damages he
caused his victim. Secondly, compensation to the injured party is
assured because insurance company funds discharge the liability
and thus recovery by the victim does not hinge on the solvency of
the offending motorist. Of course such an arrangement, due to legal
and contractual design, does not assure compensation to all traffic
accident victims. Under present tort law an injured party has no
legal claim to damages against the motorist unless the latter has
been at fault and the victim blameless.' Although a widely
discussed and controversial topic, the question of whether
automobile insurance should free itself from the "fault principle"
and compensate most, if not all, traffic victims on a "non-fault"
3
basis is beyond the scope of this article.
However, a second, serious limitation inherent in the private
(and usually voluntary) insurance arrangement involves the
offending motorist who is not covered by a liability policy. What
happens if, for one reason or another, the operator of the vehicle
turns out to be "uninsured"--a condition often tantamount to
financial irresponsibility? In such a case the victim, although
he has a valid claim against the offending motorist, may find'
himself unable to enforce itA This situation of unenforcible liability
is an affront to the legal order which requires wrongdoers to
indemnify their victims. Furthermore, in light of the hazards to life
and limb created by modern traffic, financial irresponsibility of this
nature presents a grave social evil,5 but attempts to cope with it
2 Another serious limitation of the present liability insurance-compensation scheme arises
from the fact that many policies are written at the inadequate minimum level of $10,000 for

injuries suffered by a single claimant and $20,000 for injuries suffered by all claimants
arising out of one accident. Thus in 1966, for example, 30c of all New York Motorists,
32; of those in Massachusetts, and 52% of those in North Carolina, carried only the minimum
coverage required by law. Hashmi, Comnpulsory Automobile Insurance. 1967-1968 Ball State
University Lecture Series 5.

' The most thorough modern study of the "fault" versus "non-fault" controversy in auto
liability insurance is KEETON & O'CONNELL. For a recent analysis of "non-fault" compensation plans, see King. The Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans. 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1137 (1968).

With respect to financial irresponsibility, it has been stated that "[tlhe cold fact [is] that
where there is no liability insurance, legal rights and liabilities are largely meaningless." C.
KULP. CASUALTY INSURANCE
FOR

RESEARCH

IN THE

201 (3d ed. 1956). See also

SOCIAL SCIENCES,

COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS

G.

REPORT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL

BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY

203-05 (1932).

HALLMAN, UNSATISFIED' JUDGMENT FUNDS 5-19 (University Microfilms, Inc., Ann

Arbor, 1965).

Vol. 1969: 227]

LA CK OF INSURA NCE

have remained, at least in the United States, a subject of continuing

controversy. The American insurance industry, by designing a
special kind of accident policy which protects the holder against the

risk of being hit by a negligent, uninsured driver, has sponsored a
new solution: insurance against another's failure to insure.
Over the past decade, legislation dealing with this novel policy

has been enacted in state after state,6 plainly bespeaking the
existence of a concerted, nation-wide industry drive. The policy is

called "Family Protection Coverage" or more prosaically, the
"Uninsured Motorist Endorsement ' 7 and, like liability insurance,
is "tort-related," i.e., no insurance is payable to the Endorsement-

insured unless he is blameless and the uninsured motorist is at fault
in causing the accident. However, unlike liability insurance the

Endorsement is a form of "first-party" insurance, the victim
receiving compensation from his own insurance company. The
Endorsement is attached. by way of a "package deal" to the

conventional automobile liability policy. In a number of
jurisdictions, the Endorsement must be bought if a liability policy
is obtained. More often it must be, to use the graphic term of the
trade, "rolled-on," '

i.e., automatically attached to the liability

policy unless the customer explicitly rejects itY
Part I of this article sketches the background of this newcomer
to the American insurance scene; Part II outlines the principal
6 .. Despite the fact that compulsory automobile insurance has not caught on through
legislation, compulsory uninsured automobile insurance has swept the country perhaps faster
than any piece of statutory enactment other than the Uniform Commercial Code," Aksen,
Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, I CONN. L. REV. 70, 74 (1968).
7 The policy in question will hereinafter be referred to as the Endorsement. For a recent
summary of Endorsement legislation and statutory citation, see J. CORBLEY, UNINSURED
MOTORIST PROTECTION, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH Appendix A, 38-42
(1968); see also American Insurance Association, Chart of Mandatory Uninsured Motorist
Provisions (Jan. 1969). A most thoughtful article is Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 497 (1967). For bibliographies see J. CORBLEY, supra
25-37; G. HALLMAN, supra note 5, at viii-xxiv; Seide, Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 19
ARB. J. (n.s.) 45-50 (1964).
The "roll-on" technique was developed when the Endorsement was still optional.
Hashmi, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 20 THE ANNALS OF THE SOCIETY OF CHARTERED
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS 147, 155 n.16 (1967). It is still used in that
fashion, e.g., in New York for the "extraterritorial" Endorsement, which is optional. See
note 192 infra and accompanying text.
The insured may reject the Endorsement in the 35 jurisdictions in which it is not
mandatory; they are listed by J. CORBLEY. supra note 7, at 38-42.
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terms of the Endorsement; Part Ill examines selected aspects of its
operation as reflected by litigation; and Part IV comments on the
grave deficiencies which emerge from this inquiry.

I. BACKGROUND
To understand the rise of the Endorsement from obscurity to
near-universality during the last decade, it must be recalled that the
problem of uninsured motorists and attempted solutions date back
at least half a century. By 1919, Mr. Ford's mass-produced and
inexpensive Model T had been on the market for over a decade'
and more and more motorists were able to buy automobiles, often
second-hand. Most of them did not bother to insure themselves
against liability. Some may not have appreciated the hazards of
driving and thus may have been willing to "chance it." Others,
presumably the majority, were too poor to spend money on
insurance premiums. In any event, within a decade the uninsured
motorist had become a national problem. Legislative action seemed
necessary.
Compulsory Insurance
In 1925, after six years of controversy," Massachusetts became
the first among the common law jurisdictions to take the step
which, to this day, remains the most rational solution. Beginning in
1927 private motorists were compelled to insure themselves against
the risk of tort liability arising from their negligent driving.,' The
impact of this new, mandatory approach may be gauged by the
simple fact that almost overnight the percentage of uninsured
motorists in Massachusetts was reduced from more than 70 to 1
3
or 2 percent.1
"°The Model T was introduced in 1908 and sold for $850.00. See K. SWARD, THE LEGEND
OF HENRY FORD

24-25 (1948).

11Blanchard,

Compulsory Vehicle Liability Insurance in Massachusetts, 3 LAW
CONTEMP. PROB. 537 (1936).
J MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ IA to 34A (Supp. 1968).
' The Massachusetts
Registrar of Motor Vehicles estimated that only 1% of
Massachusetts motorists had failed to comply in 1929 with the compulsory insurance law,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 45 (1932).
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From the outset the American insurance industry has bitterly
opposed compulsory insurance. 14 Among the more serious
arguments' 5 against such a system were the industry's fear of
political meddling with premium rate structures, the fear of reduced
profits due to the inability of the insurers to select only the "better
risks" among the applicants, and, 'More generally, the dislike of
governmental regulation of private business. Furthermore, it was
thought that regulation would eventually lead to governmentoperated insurance. Whatever the merits of these arguments, the
industry's adamant opposition proved decisive and compulsory
insurance was confined to Massachusetts for nearly thirty years.
Not until 1956 was Massachusetts joined by New York 6 and not
until a year later by North Carolina. 17 In contrast, and subject to
the "financial responsibility laws" to be noted next, automobile
liability insurance in the other 47 jurisdictions has remained
substantially the same as it was in the days of the Model T
Ford-the motorist's free choice.
FinancialResponsibility Laws
Beginning in the late twenties the insurance industry, in an
attempt to ward off compulsory insurance, came forward with its
own solution. Embodied in legislation euphoniously labeled
"financial responsibility laws," these provisions were enacted under
8
the industry's sponsorship nearly everywhere in the United States.
Since they have been the subject of extensive analysis, 9 only their
main features are relevant here. Essentially they were based on the
notion of selective and delayed rather than universal and immediate
11For a recent critique of the American industry's position toward compulsory insurance,
see Hashmi, supra note 2, passim.
These and others are analyzed in detail by Hashmi, supra note 2, at 65-90.

'5

"Law of April 16, 1956, ch. 655, § 2 (now N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-21
(McKinney 1960), as amended, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 312-318 (McKinney Supp.

1968)).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to 319 (Supp. 1967).
11
"The first of these was enacted in Connecticut in 1925, Law of January i, 1925, ch. 183,
[1925] Conn. Pub. Acts 3956 (repealed 1927).
"See. e.g., Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505
(1936); Feinsinger, Administrative Problems of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 531 (1936); Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident
Compensation. 50 COLUM. L. REV. 300 (1950); Hume, Are Our Financial Responsibility
Laws Adequate? What Can We Do To Improve Them?, 19 FED. OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 60

(196869).
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compulsion to insure against liability. Contemporary versions20
require every driver who becomes "involved" in a serious traffic
accident to surrender his license (and registration plates) unless he
produces "security" for the damages he may have to pay to the
victims of the accident. If insured, the driver will be able to furnish
the required security simply by exhibiting his liability policy. If
uninsured, however, the driver must either make the required
deposit or give up driving (and registration) until he can show that
he was blameless or until he comes to terms with his victim. If, as
usual, he is financially irresponsible, the best that the law can do is
to force him off the road while his unfortunate victim remains
uncompensated. The flaw basic to this entire approach is evident:
the "financial responsibility laws," in effect, ignore the first victim
of a driver who is both uninsured and financially irresponsible.2'
Since under these statutes no driver is compelled to insure until he
has had a serious accident, substantial numbers of financially
irresponsible drivers remain on the road and uninsured. In light
of this situation it is not surprising that in the early fifties the
industry was confronted with renewed demands for more effective
measures to deal with this problem. 22 Once again compulsory
insurance was proposed.
The "Nominal Defendant"
At this critical juncture fifteen years ago, history, or at any
rate, American insurance history, repeated itself. The insurance
industry once more presented to American legislatures a solution of
its own, the Endorsement. As before, the industry's action was
motivated by the fear of compulsory insurance legislation. This
time, however, it also dreaded another, more recent device-the
creation of public funds to indemnify the victims of uninsured
motorists.P Already well-established legislative schemes in other
New Hampshire was the first state to adopt a modern version, Law of July 14, 1937,
ch. 161, [1937] N.H. Laws 293 (repealed 1949).

2'The comtemporary versions of these laws are described and criticized in Grad, supra note
19. The American Insurance Association published in 1967 an intricate "Four Chart
Analysis of Financial Responsibility and Related Laws" which groups the complex
legislation in all states according to its main features.
2 Netherton & Nabhan, The New York Motor Vehicle Financial SecurityAct of 1956, 5
A.I. U.L. REv. 37 (1956).
'
13For a careful analysis of fhe 'nominal defendant" versions in the United States and

Canada, see G.

HALLMAN,

supra note 5. Brief summaries of European versions appear in
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parts of the world, these funds were capable of ready adaptation to
American conditions.
The honors for having pioneered the underlying concept belong
jointly to two Australian states, South Australia and Victoria. A
1936 South Australian statute permitted the victim of an
unidentified "hit and run" driver to recover from a "nominal
defendant." 24 This defendant, appointed by the state treasurer, was
held liable if the victim could prove that he would have recovered
from the negligent driver had it been possible to identify him.5 A
1939 Victoria enactment broadened this scheme to include all
situations in which an automobile accident victim was unable to
recover because the negligent driver turned out to be uninsured and
financially irresponsible.2 6 Significantly, the South Australia and
Victoria schemes supplemented a regime of compulsory liability
insurance 7 In both jurisdictions there were limitations on claims
by passengers. Otherwise, recoveries from the nominal defendant
were not limited in amount; although the victim was first required
to obtain a judgment against the driver and prove that it could not
be satisfied. 28 The funds necessary to permit the "nominal
defendant" to meet his statutory liabilities were contributed by the
insurance companies who in turn passed them on through increased
premium rates to automobile owners as a class 9 The scheme first
appeared in North America in 1945 in the province of Manitoba as
an "unsatisfied judgment fund." '3 Thereafter, in one form or
another, such funds were enacted in most Canadian provinces, in
Europe and elsewhere 3 ' Inevitably, once the basic notion proved
Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection Presently Available
and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 283, 302-06

(1960).
24Castles, Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance in Australasia. 6 Am. J. ComP. L.

257, 264 (1957).
25Id.
' Id. at 264, 268.
2 Id. at 261-68; Castles, Legislative Reform of the Nominal Dejendant Provisions of the
Motor Car Act, 7 REs JUDICATAE 153 (1955).
2 The requirement that the victim first obtain a judgment has lead to the familiar term
'unsatisfied judgment fund." Since, typically, uninsured motorists cannot be properly
served, or if served, simply default, modern funds relax this requirement, subject to suitable
safeguards for the protection of the fund, G. HALLMAN, supra note 5, at 107-10.

2 Castles, supra note 24, at 269.
" MAN. REV. STAT. ch. 112, §§ 153-60 (1954).
31See note 23 supra.
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acceptable, considerable variations in the scope of coverage,
methods of administration, and funding appeared z The scheme is
compatible with either compulsory or more or less voluntary
liability insurance. Its adoption in the United States would have
removed a crucial objection to the "financial responsibility laws":
the "nominal defendant" will compensate the first victim of an
uninsured motorist on the same basis as the second or third3l
The American insurers rejected this solution as they had earlier
rejected compulsory insurance. In their view the adoption of the
"'nominal defendant" scheme was nothing short of a prelude to
state-run insurance, and again their opposition proved decisive 5
Yet, if this was a victory for the industry comparable to the battle
won against compulsory insurance, it was merely defensive. In the
early fifties the industry realized that it had become futile to call
again for more effective enforcement of traffic rules and "public

u In Canada, most of the unsatisfied judgment funds are administered (under special
arrangements with the provincial governments) by the insurers themselves (many of whom
incidentally, are controlled by American companies). G. HALLMAN, supra note 5, at 41-49.
" E.H.S. Piper, the present counsel of the All Canada Insurance Federation pointed this
compensation scheme out to his American colleagues 16 years ago: "It was almost in the
nature of a guarantee that the Safety Responsibility Law would be successful in achieving
the results everyone desired that the undertaking was given that, if the Safety Responsibility
Law were adopted, the insurance business would provide for the few who were unable to
enforce judgments rendered in their favor against the negligent motorist by financing and
operating the Fund." Piper, Canadian Unsatisfied Judgment Funds, 3 FEDERATION OF INS.
COUNSEL Q. 25, 33 (1953). Theoretically and, of course, in practice, the number of uninsured
motorists and hence the financial burden for the "nominal defendant" will be substantially
lower where a motorist's failure to insure is a criminal offense.
31For a consideration of the New Jersey experience, for instance, see Wise, The Problems
of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist and the Uncompensated Accident Victim, 1957
INs. L.J. 139, 142.
-1 The industry has lost a few battles against "state-run" insurance, however. In the wake
of its Canadian neighbor province Manitoba, North Dakota established a veiy modestly
conceived "unsatisfied judgment fund" in 1947, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01 to 39-17-10
(1960), as anended. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01 to 39-17-10 (Supp. 1967). In 1952, New
Jersey enacted similar fund legislation, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 6-61 to 6-91 (1961), as
amended N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39: 6-62 to 6-87 (Supp. 1968). Maryland followed in 1957,
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66 §§ 150-179 (1967), as amended, MD. ANN. CODE §§ 150-177
(Supp. 1968), and Michigan in 1965, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.2801-9.2831 (1968), as
amended. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.2803-9.2827 (Supp. 1969). For the situation in New York
see notes 40 & 63 infra.
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responsibility laws" and hope for the best3 6 It was at this point
3 7
that, as a "constructive" alternative, the Endorsement emerged
II.

THE ENDORSEMENT

History

As early as 1925 an insurance company offered "unsatisfied
judgment" insurance. The policy required the insurer to pay an
insured after he had reduced his claim against a motorist to
judgment and proved that he was unable to collect on it. The
innovation made little headway 9 Between 1952 and 1953, in the
midst of the bitter legislative battles over compulsory insurance
waged in New York, the industry seemed to become aware of the
potentialities of the device;0 and the nationwide significance of the

underlying issues. Accordingly in 1956 two major insurance
groups" joined in promulgating, and from time to time amending,
standard conditions for the Endorsement.!2 In so doing the industry
followed a procedure established for automobile liability policies
which had been standardized in 1936.
Moser, The Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1956 INS. L.J. 719, 720.
""Faced again with the threat of compulsory insurance or government take-over, the
companies invented . . . [the Endorsement] and hastily presented it as their defense to these
threats." Pretzel, Uninsured Motorist: Uneasy Money-Unless Modified, 1965 INS. L.J.
711, 712; see also Caverly, New Provisions for Protection from Injuries inflicted by an
Uninsured Automobile, 1956 INS. L.J. 19. 20: Moser. supra note 36, at 719.
m George, Insuring Injuries Caused -by Uninsured Motorists. 1956 INS. L.J. 715; Plummer,
The Uncompensated Automobile Accident Victim, 1956 INS. L.J. 459, 464.
George, supra note 38, at 718.
in 1954 the New York insurance companies were ready to accept a "'nominal
defendant" scheme -for the compensation of those who had voluntarily obtained Endorsement
coverage. When the Harriman administration continued the efforts of Governor Dewey to
introduce compulsory legislation, the insurers again proposed the "voluntary Endorsement"
as the answer to the uninsured motorist problem. See generally Netherton & Nabhan, supra
note 22, at 47-48 & n.36. The insurers offered a wide variety of Endorsements. Several issued
"unsatisfied judgment" insurance. New York's mutual insurers offered Endorsements which
did not require proof of the uninsured driver's negligence-it was "presumed."
Morgenbesser, Some Legal Aspects of the New York Uninsured Motorists' Coverage, 1956
INS. L.J. 241, 242; Plummer, supra note 38, at 464. Another version, much like a true
accident policy, included a death and dismemberment schedule, along with fixed compensation
payments, thus eliminating the issue of damages from the bargaining between insurer and
insured. George, supra note 38, at 718.
41The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters representing the stock companies, and
the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau, representing the mutual companies.
12 Form A-615, dated December 12, 1956. A revised form was issued on May 1, 1958
(Form A-615 a). The third revision was dated May 1, 1966 (Form UM). The 1956 and 1963
versions are reproduced in J. CORBLEY, supra note 7, at 44 & 46.
4 Herbert, The General Practitionerand the Basic Automobile Policy, 1957 INS. L.J. 163.

u See, e.g..
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Before briefly outlining some of the more significant provisions"

of the Endorsement, a cautionary note is in order. In many
instances the industry's form, somewhat like a "uniform act", has
been modified in a particular jurisdiction by statute, administrative
rule or judicial decision. This process is continuing and some of the

more recent modifications are noted later. Of special importance is
the fact that several large insurers insist on using their own
versions.4 5 However, such variations have not prevented the

emergence of a common pattern. The following observations apply,
unless otherwise indicated, to the most recent standard

Endorsement published in 19661
Broadly speaking the Endorsement47 protects a victim against
the risk of being injured or killed by a negligent uninsured
motorist.1 There is no requirement that the insured first obtain a
judgment against the uninsured motorst and that it be returned
unsatisfied. The Endorsement considers a victim as an "insured"
when he falls within either of two groups: the first consists of the
1 Georgia, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia also
provide protection against property damage. For statutory citations, see J. CORBLEY, supra
note 7, at 38-41. This additional coverage is beyond the scope of this article.
SE.g., Allstate Insurance Company Policy, CCH AuTo. L. REP. (Ins.)
2670, State
Farm Mutual Policy, CCH AUTO L. REP. (Ins.) 3520. The "independent" companies, which
number over 400, feel free to use their own forms since they are not affiliated with the two organizations which drafted the standard Endorsement. The independents claim to write more
automobile policies than the companies represented by the two organizations. Widiss, supra
note 7, at 502 n. 16.
11See note 7 supra. While the 1966 Endorsement uses the inclusive term "highway
vehicle," this article will instead use the term "automobile" which is still common in all
other versions. For more technical and detailed descriptions, see Notman, A Decennial Study
oJ the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 7-23 (1967); Widiss,
supra note 7, at 500-23.
Since the fifties uninsured motorist coverage was also offered as a separate policy.
Deschamps, Coverage Jbr Innocent Victim Pays Off 1956 INs. L.J. 722, 724. Although
pedestrians dan hardly be expected to purchase such a policy in significant numbers, it seems
to be available outside of New York. Hashmi, supra note 8, at 149, 151, 155.
'-In actuality, the "'Endorsement" is a full-fledged insurance policy sui generis; the term
itself means no more than that the policy it embodies is available only as an appendage to
the basic automobile liability policy. Although classed as an "appendage," it is in fact a
formidable instrument of almost 2400 words, and matches in length and complexity the
liability policy to which it is annexed. First the policy defines the risk against which the
insured is protected. Then several broad qualifications on the insured's claim against the
insurer are established. In addition, six elaborate definitions of key terms are presented with
numerous "'exclusions" from the preceding coverage. Finally, eleven further "conditions"
are set forth in fourteen sections and subsections.
14Subsections Endorsement, I. Coverage U-Uninsured Motorists.
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individual whom the principal policy (i.e., the automobile liability
policy to which the Endorsement is appended) names as insured
(the "named insured") and of those family members (spouse and
relatives of either) who share his or her household.49 This group is
protected regardless where the accident overtakes the victim,
whether as pedestrian, driver, occupant of a car or otherwise. The
second group consists of all individuals who at the time of the
accident are "occupying the insured automobile." 50 Although the
is primarily the car covered by the
"insured automobile"
"principal policy," '5 this favored status ends whenever the vehicle
52
is used without the owner's permission
However, no victim, regardless of the group of insureds to
which he belongs, can recover unless the offending car was "an
uninsured automobile. 53 A car is considered "uninsured" if at the
time of the accident, in respect of the injuries caused by its
negligent operator, no bodily injury liability insurance policy is
applicable; or where such *a policy is applicable but the insurer
"denies coverage"; or the car is a "hit and run automobile" (of
course it may or may not have been insured). An important
exclusion from or qualification of this definition is that a car is
never an "uninsured automobile" (and hence the policy does not
protect) if the negligently operated car is owned either by a selfinsurer or by the federal or state governments, their agencies and
subsdivisions.54
A series of special requirements must be met before an offending
car is a "'hit and run" vehicle and, as such, an "uninsured automobile." 5 The victim's injuries must have resulted from the
car's "physical contact" with his body or with the car in which he
was riding; he must be unable to ascertain the offending car's
operator or owner; a proper report of the accident must have been
made to the authorities within 24 hours; and within 30 days he
"Id. 11. Persons Insured (a).
"Id. II. Persons Insured (b).
Another car becomes an "insured automobile" while the named insured, or his spouse
residing in the same household, drives it unless a resident of that household has it "'in
regular use." Id. V. Additional Definitions, Insured Automobile, (c), Exclusion (iv).
12 Id. V. Additional Definitions, Insured Automobile, (a), (c) and Exclusion (ii).
" Id. V. Additional Definitions, Uninsured Automobile, (a), (b).

"Id. V.Additional Definitions, Uninsured Automobile, Exclusions (i), (ii).
"Id. V. Additional Definitions, Hit-and-Run Vehicle, (b).
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must have filed with the insurer a sworn statement of his claim
with facts supporting it.
Coverage is denied or reduced in certain circumstances of which
only the more frequent will be noted. The claimant will forfeit his
claim against, the insurer completely if without the latter's written
consent he settles with those liable for tAe injury. 6 If the offending
motorist or those liable with him make any payment to the victim,
the latter's claim against the insurer is reduced pro tanto7 even if
the damages exceed the Endorsement's coverage limits. The same is
true of a payment made by the insurer under the principal liability
policy on behalf of another insured who is also liable to the victim
for the injury suffered, and of all sums paid or payable to the
victim under any workmen's compensation law, disability benefits
58
law or any similar law.
Special provisions apply where similar insurance policies exist.
Thus if the insured has occupied a car of another who in turn has
obtained an Endorsement for that car, he is of course also an
"insured" under that Endorsement. Yet the claim payable under
the insured's own Endorsement is reduced to the amount by which
its coverage limits exceed those of the other Endorsement.P9 More
generally, the victim's damages are "deemed" not to exceed the
higher of the limits contained in any of the applicable
Endorsements. This means that whenever his real damages exceed
these "deemed" limits, the existence of several Endorsements will
be ignored insofar as the "excess" damages are concerned. In any
event, the insurer will be liable only for that proportion which the
maximum payable under the insured's Endorsement bears to the
total of all amounts optimally recoverable under the several
Endorsements. For example, if the victim could claim under three
different Endorsements wiih a maximum of $10,000 each, the
liability of each insurer will be reduced to one-third or $3,333.33
regardless7 of the total amount of actual damages suffered. These
limitations on the right to recover are especially significant because
coverage under the Endorsement is generally limited to $10,000 for
a single claim and $20,000 for multiple claims arising out of the
AId. I. Coverage U-Uninsured Motorists, Exclusion, (a).
Ill. Limits of Liability, (b)(1).
Id. I1. Limits of Liability, (b)(2).
Id. VI. Additional Conditions, E. Other Insurance, Subsecs. I, 2.
I'

'7Id.
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same accident. 0 These low amounts are occasionally fixed by state
law but they exist for the most part by virtue of the industry's
refusal to write higher limits61
Finally, one of the boldest innovations of the Endorsement is
the preclusion of a claimant's access to the courts. Whenever the
insured and the insurer cannot agree as to whether the insured "is
legally entitled to recover . . . damages from the owner or
operator" or do not agree as to the "amount. . .owing under this

insurance" the matter or matters are to be settled "by arbitration
. . .in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association.""2
11I.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

The complex Endorsement policy was drawn up by an
anonymous group of draftsmen who apparently defined its terms
without the benefit of discussion other than among themselves. On
occasion the 1956 standard Endorsement has been revised by its
draftsmen or modified by statute or regulation. More often than
not, however, the pertinent legislation has given free rein to the
draftsmen's work, the classic illustration being the New York
Endorsement which in substance reflects the 1956 standard form.
Consequently the judicial interpretation of the Endorsement's terms
is of special interest. The very concept of an insurance policy
against the results of another's failure to insure, as.it emerges from
this over-simplified outline, suggests puzzling questions about the
philosophy, interpretation and practical operation of the novel
policy. It has, in fact, already produced an astonishingly large body
of case law which is growing daily6 3 Unfortunately, due to this
"According to a chart published in 1968, Alaska, California, North Carolina, Virginia
and Washington now have maxima of t15,000 for single claims and $30,000 for all claims

arising out of the same accident. Connecticut has a unitary maximum of $20,000. J.
CORBLEY, supra note 7, at 38-42.
fi Notman, supra note 46, at 17 n.71. The Virginia statute requires insurers to offer higher
limits. Aksen, supra note 6, at 73, n.10. A large Illinois insurer is said to offer coverage in
amounts equal to liability coverage, Pretzel, supra note 37, at 713.
82 Standard Endorsement, I. Coverage U-Uninsured Motorists, Subsecs. 1;VI. Additional

Conditions, F. Arbitration.
a "When compared to all the rest of the language in the usual automobile policy, the.

[Endorsement] language takes less than one third of the space needed for the total policy.
1-Iowever the . .. [Endorsement] coverage has provided us with more questions in recent
years than all of the other provisions combined." Schallert, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage-Bane or Blessing? 1968 INs. L.J. 917, 918. Most of the case law is based on the
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plethora of litigation only a few issues can be selected for
examination. These illuminate not only the attitudes displayed by
the insurers toward the Endorsement but also the practically
unlimited potential for litigation it presents.
The Arbitration Clause
Paradoxically the Endorsement's most litigated provisions have
been precisely the ones intended to forestall litigation by forcing the
claimant to arbitrate, not litigate, his disagreements with the
insurer. In the event of a dispute arbitration is required to
determine whether "the insured . . . is legally entitled to recover
• . . damages" from the offending motorist and, if so, "the
amount . . . thereof."' The insurers took the "narrow" view of
what is arbitrable under this equivocal wording, adopting the
position that no more than three issues can be decided by the
arbitrator. 5 (1) was the uninsured motorist negligent; (2) was the
victim free from contributory negligence; and if so, (3).what are his
damages? Insureds, however, took the "broad" view that the terms
of the clauses made all issues, including particularly the existence of
insurance coverage, arbitrable. In any event, the insureds further
argued that any lurking ambiguity should be resolved, as
elsewhere, against the insurers. 6 At the outset one may speculate
why the insurer draftsmen who repeatedly revised the standard
Endorsement did not lay the controversy to rest simply by restating
their "narrow" view in precise language. Judicial reaction has
remained mixed. The "broad" view was apparently adopted in
New York Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Law of 1958, N.Y. INS, LAW §§ 167,
600-26 (McKinney 1966). The statute provides not only for a compulsory Endorsement but
extends protection against uninsured motorists to pedestrians ("qualified" claimants) who do
not come under the protective umbrella of an Endorsement. These claimants assert their
claims against a "nominal defendant," the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation [hereinafter referred to as MVAIC]. On the background of this legislation, see
Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation:Past. Present. and
Future. 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 215, 226-29 (1959); for the text of the Endorsement, as
promulgated by the MVAIC, see J. CORDLEY, supra note 7, at 51.
"Standard Endorsement I. Coverage U-Uninsured Motorists.
s Fairgrave & Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 1964 INS. COUNSEL J. 665, 669;
Fieting, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage, 1961 INS. COUNSEL J. 629,
630-31; McLaughlin, Arbitration Under Uninsured Motorists Coverage, 46 CmI. BAR
RECORD 58, 60 (1964).
"See. e.g.. Rosenbaum v. Am. Sur. Co., II N.Y.2d 310, 316, 183 N.E.2d 667, 670. 229
N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1962) (dissenting opinion); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sherwood, 26 Misc.
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Massachusetts, 7 Pennsylvania and elsewhere. 68 In contrast New
York's trial and intermediate appellate courts disagreed among

themselves for years69 until finally a closely divided Court of
Appeals sustained the "narrow" view. 0 This view, under the
complex mechanism of the Endorsement, opens a broad spectrum

of legal and factual issues to litigation because any issue other than
those involving fault or damages must be determined by a court as

a preliminary to arbitration 1
In New York all these issues must be resolved in favor of the
victim as conditions precedent to arbitration; until this is done, the
MVAIC or, since 1965, the insurer, will be granted a stay of
arbitration. Typically, the New York courts decide the following

issues: was the victim "insured"; 72 was the offending car "an
uninsured automobile"; 73 was there a "disclaimer" by the
tortfeasor's insurer;u7 was there a "hit-and-run" accident;' 5 and did
the victim give timely notice to the MVAIC or the insureri 6 On
2d 513, 514, 205 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (Sup. Ct. 1960), rev'd on other grounds. 13 App. Div.
2d 507, 212 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1961).
'-See. e.g.. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Garney, 348 Mass. 627, 205 N.E.2d 8 (1965). But
see Cohen, Uninsured Motorists Protection-Coverage U in Massachusetts, 51 MAss. L.Q.
135, 146-47 (1967).
" See. e.g.. Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 749, 52 Cal. Rptr
721 (1966); McKinney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ohio App. 2d 136, 216 N.E.2d 887 (1966);
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Medycki, 431 Pa. 67, 244 A.2d 655 (1968); Nat'l Grange Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 428 Pa. 179, 236 A.2d 758 (1968). But see Pac. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lang,
, 71 Cal. Rptlr. 637 (1968); Jordan v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 232
Cal. App. 2d Cal. App. 2d 127,42 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1965).
"1For authorities adopting the "'broad" view with respect to which issues are arbitrable,
see, e.g.. MVAIC v. Velez, 14 App. Div. 2d 276, 220 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1961); Zurich Ins. Co.
v. Camera, 14 App. Div. 2d 669, 219 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1961); Royal Indem. Co. v. McMahon,
10 App. Div. 2d 926, 200 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1960) (per curiam).
1,For courts adopting the "narrow" view, see. e.g.. MVAIC v. Brown, 15 App. Div. 2d
578, 223 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1961); Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Digamus, 9 App. Div. 2d 998, 194
N.Y.S.2d 770 (1959).
" Rosenbaum v. Am. Sur. Co.. 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1962).
71McGuiness v. MVAIC, 32 Misc. 2d 949, 225 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
13Rosenbaum v. Am. Sur. Co., II N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1962).
11Ryan v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div. 2d 949, 255 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1964); MVAIC v. Brown, 15
App. Div. 2d 578, 223 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1961).
11MVAIC v. Downey, 11 N.Y.2d 995, 183 N.E.2d 758, 229 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1962); De
Puccio v. MVAIC, 30 App. Div. 2d 1015, 294 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1968).
16See. e.g.. MVAIC v. Malone, 16 N.Y.2d 1027, 213 N.E.2d 316, 265 N.Y.S.2d 906
(1965); MVAIC v. Goldman, 33 Misc. 2d 703, 227 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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demand of either party the issues are decided by jury trial." The
burden of proof throughout is on the claimant, including, in
particular, the burden of establishing that the offending car was
not insured s Appellate reversals are frequent," especially where
such "mixed" issues of fact and law as "reasonable notice" are
involved. Lingering uncertainties about the scope of the clause
stimulate further litigation. Thus notwithstanding the Court of
Appeals' decision in 1962,80 neither the bar nor the lower courts of
New York seems certain as to the division of issues into arbitrable
and non-arbitrable ones. 8'
Disclaimers

The insured motorist who breaches his obligations to his own
insurer created a special problem of interpretation under the
Endorsement. By failing to report to or to cooperate with his
insurer after an accident, the insured motorist gravely jeopardizes
the insurer's conduct of the defense against the victim's claim
arising from the accident.12 On the other hand, permitting the
insurer to rescind the policy by disclaiming its liability because of
7 Rosenbaum
v. Am. Sur. Co., II N.Y.2d 310, 313, 183 N.E.2d 667, 668, 229
N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1962).
' Vitrano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 1967); Merchants
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sehmid, 56 Misc. 2d 360, 288 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1968); cf Pan Am.
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Loyd, 411 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App. 1967).
Is Egloff v. MVAIC, 29 App. Div. 2d 1048, 289 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1968); Haas v. MVAIC, 29
App. Div. 2d 447, 289 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1968); Pagan v. MVAIC, 28 App. Div. 2d 1119, 285
N.Y.S.2d 115 (1967); Lloyd v. MVAIC. 27 App. Div. 2d 396, 279 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1967);
MVAIC v. Stein, 23 App. Div. 2d 526, 255 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Jahrling, 16 App. Div. 2d 501, 229 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1962).
"Rosenbaum v. Am. Sur. Co., II N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1962).
52 On no fewer than five occasions since 1962 the New York Court of Appeals has found it
necessary to clarify its adherence to the narrow view of "arbitrable" issues. See Napolitano
v. MVAIC, 21 N.Y.2d 281, 234 N.E.2d 438, 287 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967); Vanguard Ins. Co.
v. Polchlopek, 18 N.Y.2d 376, 222 N.E.2d 383, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966); Carlos v.
MVAIC. 17 N.Y.2d 614, 216 N.E.2d 26, 268 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1966); De Luca v. MVAIC, 17
N.Y.2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 482, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966); MVAIC v. Malone, 16 N.Y.2d 1027,
213 N.E.2d 316, 265 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1965). Similar uncertainty is apparent in other jurisdictions. For the experience in Florida and California, see Widiss, supra note 7, at 539-40.
Compare Am. Ins. Co. v. Gernard, Cal. App. 2d -,
68 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1968) with
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orlando, - Cal. App. 2d ., 69 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1968).
2A parallel situation arises where the insurer discovers after the accident that the insured
has induced the issuance of the 'policy by fraudulent misrepresentations.
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the insured's misconduct leaves the victim much as if the offending
policy-holder had been uninsured from the outset. The problem can
be resolved by shifting the risk of the policy-holder's misconduct to
his insurer. Thus, vis-a-vis an accident victim, the insurer may be
denied the right to disclaim, a technique used in many "public
responsibility law" jurisdictions onde a motorist is compelled to
obtain a policy.P In all other instances, however, the insurers are
permitted to disclaim for breach of policy conditions, thus leaving
the victim financially stranded. It was readily foreseeable that the
victim would oppose any attempt to differentiate between an
uninsured driver and a policy-holder whose misconduct provokes a
cancellation of his policy. After all, whatever the legal distinctions,
it is difficult for common sense to distinguish the two situations.
The draftsmen of the original version of the Endorsement did
not define "uninsured automobile" precisely enough to settle the
issue. They described as uninsured an automobile to which "no
. . . insurance policy [is] applicable-at the time of the accident.' '
One question immediately raised was whether this phrase included
the disclaimer situation. Predictably, the insurers took a "hard"
line approach and argued that an insured has "insurance applicable
at the time of the accident" even if later disclaimed. In contrast,
and again predictably, the insureds took a "soft" line, urging an
interpretation consistent with the general purpose of the instrument
to alleviate the plight of uncompensated victims. In any event, the
insured discovered in the phrase a latent ambiguity that ought to be
resolved against the insurer. 5 An early New York trial court
opinion dealing with the standard, not the New York, Endorsement
accepted the industry's approach," and it secured a wide judicial
following in New York.P However, on its first encounter with the
8 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21f(I) (Supp. 1965). For the situation under N.Y.
& TRAF. LAW § 345(i)(1) (McKinney 1966) see Ward, supra note 63, at 219-21

V'EH.

(Ward cites 38 states in which as of August 1958, "required" policies became absolute after
loss. Id. at 219 n.10).
I"Standard Endorsement (1956), i, Definitions, (c), Uninsured Automobile, (1).
"Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Polchlopek, 18 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 222 N.E.2d 383, 385, 275
N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (1966).
0 Berman v. Travelers Indem. Co., I I Misc. 2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
See, e.g., Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Polchlopek, 23 App. Div. 2d 625, 274 N.Y.S.2d 492
(1965), revd, 18 N.Y.2d 376, 222 N.E.2d 383, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966); Rosen v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 335, 260 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 26 Misc. 2d 859, 207 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v.
McCormack, 15 Misc. 2d 692, 182 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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problem eight years later the New York Court of Appeals, in a
closely divided opinion, repudiated the lower courts' view and held
the disclaimer situation to be embraced by the definition set out
aboveesl
In the meantime some legislatures took notice of the problem.
Upon requiring the Endorsement to be annexed to all liability
policies, nine states specifically prescribed protection in the event of
a "denial of coverage." 9 In 1963 part of the industry followed suit
by enlarging the standard Endorsement's definition of the
"uninsured automobile" to include the case where liability
insurance is applicable at the time of the accident but "the
company . . . denies coverage thereunder." 0 Even afterwards,

however, Endorsements still were being issued with the original
9
restrictive wording. 1
Despite the liberalized definition of the "uninsured automobile"
difficult questions of interpretation remain. Thus if the
Endorsement-insurer disagrees with the victim over the presence or
absence of a "denial of coverage" by the offending motorist's
liability-insurer, should this issue be determined by the arbitrator
or, as in New York since 1962,92 by the court? A further
and equally critical question arises. As already noted both the
MVAIC statute and, since 1965, the New York Endorsement
declare the automobile uninsured where the offending motorist's
insurer "disclaims liability or denies coverage." It could be argued
even under the "narrow" view of arbitration that in the absence of
a qualifying word such as "validly disclaims liability or denies
coverage" this language meant no more than that in case of a
dispute the court is limited to a determination as to whether the
insurer had in fact disclaimed-an issue that frequently arises 3
- Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Polchlopek, 18 N.Y.2d 376, 222 N.E.2d 383, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515
(1966).
"

For a list of statutes prescribing protection in event of denial of coverage, see Widiss,

supra note 7, at 512-13 n.56.
Standard Endorsement (1963), I1. Definitions, (c)(I).
"See, e.g.. Bollinger v. Travelers Indem. Co., 433 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App. 1968).
n The question had been left open in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sherwood, 13 App. Div. 2d
507, 212 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1961).
9 See, e.g., Rivera v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div. 2d 201, 254 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1964); Lumpkin
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 860, 251 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1964); Di Stefano v.
MVAIC. 34 Misc. 2d 68, 228 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
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Under that view the Endorsement-insurer would have to arbitrate
once a de facto disclaimer was judicially found to have occurred.
The MVAIC contended, however, that the victim also had to

establish in court that the insurer had validly disclaimed. Again an
occasion for much litigation was presented," with the Court of
95
Appeals eventually sustaining the MVAIC's position

The result, of course, is that the claimant may face every

conceivable kind of substantive
such determinations may entail.
caught, in a struggle between
concerned that struggle typically

and procedural complexity that
As the innocent bystander he is
two insurers. As far as he is
involves the mutual conduct and

relations of three strangers-the offending policy-holder and his

insurer and the appraisal of the resulting legal situation by the
claimant's own Endorsement insurer. The burden of proof with

respect to the invalidity of the disclaimer is on the victim96 and
years may elapse before the resulting litigation is terminated by
appellate decisions. 7 Commendably, the MVAIC, impressed by the
victim's plight, has tried to secure arbitration among insurers to
avoid this depressing spectacle. Its efforts, undertaken without

statutory basis, have had only partial success; 42 percent of the
New York insurers were unwilling to arbitrate disputes with their

peers98 however much they prefer arbitration when they deal with
their own policy holders.
" See, e.g., Rivera v. MVAIC, 22 App. Div. 2d 201, 254 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1964); Landow v.
MVAIC, 17 App. Div. 2d 976, 234 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1962); MVAIC v. Lucash, 16 App. Div.
2d 975, 230 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1962); MVAIC v. Moskowitz, 237 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Kaiser v. MVAIC, 35 Misc. 2d 636, 231 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1962); MVAIC v.
Scott, 28 Misc. 2d 492, 214 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
" MVAIC v. Malone, 16 N.Y.2d 1027, 213 N.E.2d 316, 265 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1965). The
holding in Malone may be followed elsewhere, but see St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, 425 Pa. 548, 229 A.2d 858 (1967) (even a bad faith disclaimer sufficient).
" See, e.g., Vitrano v: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 1967);
Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. App. 1963); Merchants Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Schmid, 56 Misc. 2d 360, 288 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Pan Am. Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Loyd, 411 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"See, e.g.. MVAIC v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 115, 224 N.E.2d 619, 278
N.Y.S.2d 367 (1967); Carlos v. MVAIC, 17 N.Y.2d 614, 216 N.E.2d 26, 268 N.Y.S.2d 930,
rev'g 24 App. Div. 2d 747, 263 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Malik, 30 App. Div. 2d 594, 290 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1968); Landow v. MVAIC, 17 App. Div. 2d
976, 234 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1962).
" MVAIC, ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 17, 1968, 10 (mimeo). The
signers of the agreement represent 85% of the insurance written in New York. Id. Evidently,
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The Insurer's Obligation and Other Sources of Compensation
Often an accident victim will look to compensation from several
sources: one or more tortfeasors; a workmen's compensation or
disability benefits carrier; insurers under liability, accident or
health insurance policies. How to coordinate the several potential
sources of recovery and how to allocate, if appropriate, the
ultimate burden of the loss to one or the other remains one of the
unsettled problems of modern compensation law.9 Meanwhile the
insurers try to solve it in their own way so far as the victims of
uninsured motorists are concerned. As already noted,100 the
Endorsement embodies a number of provisions limiting or
eliminating the insurer's liability whenever the victim has access to
other sources of compensation, especially from "other similar
insurance." 0
In considering the problem in light of the victim's losses, three
typical fact situations may be distinguished. The first is the least
problematic. The victim's losses are less than the limits placed on
the compensation available from each of the several sources. Here
insurers writing insurance elsewhere are not included. A recent announcement of the leading
defense lawyers' association urged its members to suggest to their insurance company clients
the settlement of inter-company disputes by voluntary arbitration (under the auspices of the
Defense Research Institute, Inc., not the American Arbitration Association); it stated in part:
-'Why must insurance companies fight among themselves over coverage questions? If the
same parties who drafted the language in the policies cannot agree as to its meaning, is there

not a bettei method than litigation to dispose of such disputes?' One need only pick up the
latest advance sheets to see the basis for the quotation. Courts continue to grind out
decisions in intercompany disputes which further tarnish the image of the industry, or
produce results that were never within the contemplation of the policy drafters." Defense

Research Institute, Inc., Arbitration Instead of Litigation. 19

FEDERATION OF INS. COUNSEL

Q. 38 (Fall 1968) (announcement).
" Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law. 54
REV. 1478 (1966).
See note 59. supra.

CALIF.

L.

Although a 'detailed discussion of the merits of the various solutions adopted by the

101

Endorsement is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that one approach has been

the use of techniques developed first for fire insurance, and later applied to liability insurance,

despite the fact that the situation is not really comparable. Note, Concurrent Coverage in
Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 319, 320 (1965). For discussion of this
technique used in connection with the Endorsement, see Comment, Uninsured Motorist
Insurance: California'sLatest Answer to the Problem of the FinanciallyIrresponsible Motorist, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 516, 523-26 (1960); Notman, supra note 46, at 16-18; Note, The
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, Some Problems of Construction, 42 TUL. L. REV. 352,
368-74 (1968).
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the pertinent provisions of the Endorsement operate simply to block
"over-" compensation of the victim. To that extent they are, or
should be, beyond challenge.1'0 Overcompensation is prevented by
requiring that the insurer's own obligation be reduced or eliminated
to the extent that others indemnify the victim or other insurance
is available to him. 0 4 By the same token this method also shifts,
pro tanto, the risk created by the uninsured motorist to a source
thought by the Endorsement's draftsmen to be more appropriate.
This is true, for example, not only for partial payments by a
tortfeasor, a joint tortfeasor or their liability insurer, 05 but also for
payments made under a workmen's compensation or disability
benefits law.'01 Thus the ultimate burden is imposed, unilaterally as
it were, on the workmen's compensation or disability benefit
insurance carriers as a group. Although the justification for this
may not be self-evident;107 in any event the victiri should not be
heard to complain that he cannot collect twice for the same injury.
The problem changes,- however, in a second type of fact
situation. Suppose the victim's loss is more than the $10,000
maximum usually provided for under the Endorsement, and "other
insurance" such as workmen's compensation or disability benefits,
is paid in the amount of $10,000. In that situation to require as
the Endorsement does that the insurer be credited with $10,000 is
to permit it to escape all liability for the victim's remaining losses.
In defense of this result it may be argued that the Endorsement
must be understood as a contractual arrangement to secure the
victim a fund of no more than $10,000; it should make no
difference to the victim whether this fund is created by payments of
I" L'Manian v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. 524, 236 A.2d 349 (Ct. App.
1967); Am. Indem. Co. v. N.Y. Fire & Marine Underwriters, 196 So. 2d 592 (La. App.
1967); cf. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962).
212 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.

Standard Endorsement, VI. Additional Conditions, E. Other Insurance.
Standard Endorsement, III. Limits of Liability, (b)(1).
'"Standard Endorsement, Il1. Limits of Liability, (b)(2).
12

167

The workmen's compensation deduction has been held not authorized by statute.

Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Austin, 202 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1967); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
189 So. 2d 907 (Fla. App. 1966); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla.
App. 1966); Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651 (1964).
Contra, Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 !11.
App. 2d 364, 202 N.E.2d 126 (1964); Allen v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 188 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 1966); Durant v. MVAIC, 15
N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E.2d.600, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
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the tortfeasor, "other insurance," workmen's compensation, or, if
needs be, by payments under the Endorsement itself. The argument
against this result is that the insured is thus forced to bear
uncompensated losses over and above this $10,000 "fund,"
contrary to the purpose of the Endorsement. After all, the insurer
did promise upon receipt of a special premium to pay, within the
$10,000 limit, "all sums which the insured . . . shall be entitled to
recover as damages"'' 8 from the uninsured motorist. Differently
stated, the insured victim may claim that the insurer's restrictive
view abandons the very concept underlying the Endorsement-that
it is meant to be a substitute for the liability policy which the
uninsured motorist should have carried. In many situations as long
as the victim is not fully compensated a motorist's liability-insurer
would have remained liable even if some other source had partially
indemnified the claimant.
The views of the ultimate purpose of the Endorsement clash
even more sharply in the third type of fact situation which has
become fairly frequent. Consider the situation of an "insured"
victim who has suffered- injuries while riding, not in the car covered
by his Endorsement, but as a guest passenger in an automobile
covered by another Endorsement. Occupying the host's car with his
permission the victim qualifies as an "insured" under the host's
Endorsement. In this hypothetical accident several other occupants
of the host's car are also injured or killed, the combined damages
of all victims far exceeding the maximum of $20,000 payable under
the host's Endorsement. As a result that amount is nearly or
completely exhausted by the demands of the claimant's fellow
victims. The claimant, unable to recover more than a fraction of
his loss, at best, under his host's Endorsement, now turns to his
"own" Endorsement insurer. The latter will seek to disclaim under a
clause providing that its liability "shall apply only as excess
insurance over any other similar insurance available to . . . [the]
insured and applicable to such vehicle."' '0 Since Endorsements
usually carry a $10,000 limit for single claims, the excess is almost
always nil. In that situation the insurer argues that similar
insurance was "available" to the victim at the time of the accident.

See note 48 supra.
rn Standard Endosement VI. Additional Conditions, E. (I).
"
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This is so even if all or most of the funds payable under the host's
Endorsement have been exhausted due to the severity of the
accident. In the insurer's view the victim would have been in
precisely the same condition had the offending motorist carried the
required minimum insurance; after all, the Endorsement is not
designed to leave the insured better off than the victim of an
insured motorist. The insured's argument, on the other hand, is
similar to the one advanced in the second type of fact pattern. If
the insurer's contention is accepted, he urges, the insurer has
collected a premium for a policy which turns out to afford merely
"phantom" coverage in a situation in which the victim's need is
most compelling. Again the very concept of the Endorsement is at
issue: if the Endorsement is no more than a substitute for minimum
coverage, the insurer's argument is convincing, for the insured's
real quarrel is not with the Endorsement as such but with the low
statutory minima for liability insurance. What the insured really
seeks is the Endorsement's protection against the inadequacy of the
statutory limits. The insurer could claim that the Endorsement was
never designed to shield against that risk. The catalog of the several
"gaps" in coverage left open by the scheme of automobile
insurance never included the loss of protection which is caused by
the exhaustion of the notoriously low minimum limits on liability
policies.
As is true of almost every basic issue that has arisen under the
Endorsement, judicial views concerning clauses limiting recovery in
the presence of "other insurance" or other sources tend to be
deeply divided." 0 The opinions rarely make any conscious effort to
differentiate among the several types of fact situations noted above.
Instead they resort to the well-known patterns of judicial
interpretation of insurance "contracts." Many courts shrug off the
arguments of the insured as inconsistent with the "contractual"
arrangements set forth in the Endorsement and are unable to
discover any ambiguity in its formulations."' Others reach the
HI For the California judicial view as to clauses limiting recovery in the presence of other
"sources," see 48 CALIr. L. REV., supra note 101, at 523-26.
M See, e.g.. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963); Darrah v. Calif.
State Auto. Ass'n, 259 Cal. App. 2d 243, 66 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1968); Globe Indem. Co. v.
Baker's Estate, 22 App. Div. 2d 658, 253 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1964); Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah
2d 157, 417 P.2d 658 (1966); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 405 P.2d 712
(1965).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1969: 227

contrary result by various methods. Thus one court will read the
phrase relating to "other . . . insurance available" as meaning
actually available and hence considers other insurance as irrelevant
when it is consumed by payments to other claimants." 2 Another
court, often without extended analysis of the underlying problem or
the statutory provisions involved, may strike down the limiting
clauses as inconsistent with the general purpose, found in the
statutory enactments that sanction the Endorsement, of protecting
the victims of uninsured motorists."' A final group of decisions has
reached the same result by seizing on the presence of such clauses
jn two or more Endorsements to invalidate all or part of them as
being mutually repugnant."' To date the issues have been firmly
settled in only a few jurisidctions. In light of their importance and
their typical recurrence it is easy to predict continued intense
litigation involving these issues on all judicial levels."'
Insolvency of the Offending Motorist's Insurer
The widely held assumption that along with banks insurers are
the most closely regulated industry is challenged by the recurrent
phenomenon of insolvent liability insurers." 6 It would seem
reasonable to assume that due to administrative supervision
insurers' involvencies are virtually impossible and that in any event
appropriate remedies exist. However, such is not the case. In nearly
"'See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robey, 270 F. Supp. 473 (D. Ark. 1967), affd, 399 F.2d
330 (8th Cir. 1968); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 209 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Va.), rev'd, 316
F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963); Kraft v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ariz. App. 276, 431 P.2d 917 (1967);
Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967).
"1 See. e.g., Tuggle v. Gov't Employees' Ins. Co., 207 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1968); Moore v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967); Bryant v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
I See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robey, 399 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968); Sparling v. Allstate
Ins. Co., Ore. -,
439 P.2d 6.16 (1968); Smith v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 40 Ore. 167,
400 P.2d 512 (1965); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112
(1968).
"1 A judge referred to the clauses as representing an "area of law which is nebulous,
unsettled and devoid of uniformity and agreement." Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d
871, 873, 405 P.2d 712, 713 (1965).
"I The Illinois Insurance Department. placed five casualty carriers in liquidation in the first
eight months of 1965. Pretzel, supra note 37, at 713 n.5. Between 1947 and 1967 the same
fate befell 29 automobile liability insurers in Pennsylvania. Feldman, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage and Insolvent Insurers-A Case History, 3 THE FORUM 37, 40, 45 (1967) (A.B.A.,
Sec. of Ins., Negl. & Compens. Law).
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all jurisdictions "7 this risk is borne by the individual insureds, or
their tort victims, and in the case of severe accidents the results
may often be disastrous. Those insureds from whom a tort
judgment is worth collecting may be financially destroyed. If they
lack substantial assets, which is usually the case, the accident
victim bears the loss. Thus whatever the legal distinctions, the
situation created by the insolvency of the offending motorist's liability
insurer is much the same as if the motorist had been uninsured at
the time of the accident. Until 1967 the nation-wide Endorsement
remained silent on this subject. When the insureds tried to bring the
insolvency situation under the Endorsement's umbrella by suitable
interpretation of the document, the insurers, consistent with their
general attitude toward the Endorsement, rejected these attempts.118
A New York trial judge upheld the industry position;11 9 as he
saw it the legislation, having failed to contemplate the insurer's
insolvency, could not be rectified by judicial interpretation: "Since
[it] creates statutory rights unknown at common law, it must
be strictly construed." ' Other courts seized on the definition of an
"uninsured automobile" as contained in the 1963 revision122 which
equated an insurer's "denial of coverage" to the initial lack of
insurance; they were willing to construe insolvency as tantamount
to such a denial. 2 3 More recently a growing number of state

MIn New York, a "Motor Vehicle Liability Security Fund," maintained by contributions
of the New York insurers, guarantees the payment of claims against insolvent insurers. N.Y.
INS. LAW § 333 (McKinney 1966).
Ms
The arguments for the conflicting positions of insurers and insureds follow a pattern
typical of insurance litigation. See Note, Uninsured Motorist Insurance Coverage in the
Event of Subsequent Insolvency or Denial of Liability by the Tortfeasor, 20 ALA. L. REv.
123 (1967).
"I Uline v. MVAIC, 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961). But see Travis
v. Gen. Accident Group, 31 App. Div. 2d 20, 294 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968) (insolvency is both

disclaimer and denial of coverage).
I" Uline v. MVAIC, 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 1005, 213 N.Y.S.2d 871, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The
opinion confuses the claim asserted by the plaintiff under the New York Endorsement with
that of a "qualified" claimant arising under the statute itself.
" Topolewski v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 6 Mich. App. 286, 148 N.W.2d 906
(1967): Seabaugh v. Sisk, 413 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App. 1968); Hardin v. Am. Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 55 Tenn. App. 189,
397 S.W.2d 411 (1965).
I2

See note 73 supra.

12Katz v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 244 Cal. App. 2d 886, 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1966);
Stephens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 562, 156 N.W.2d 133 (1968); McCaffery v. St.
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statutes have come to the victim's rescue by expressly providing
that the insolvency of the offending motorist's insurer renders his
automobile "uninsured,"' ' 24 and in 1967, following a period of
widespread adverse publicity over some spectacular insurers'
insolvencies and ensuing proposals for federal reforms, the standard
Endorsement form was specially amended to cover this situation.12a
Still, this statutory "revamping" has not been universal, and a
legislative chart based on industry data and published in 1968
shows 16 jurisdictions which make no specific provision for
6
insolvencies.2
The Statute of Limitations

The industry draftsmen failed to fix the time in the
Endorsement within which the victim must ask for arbitration or
else be barred. To be sure, the claimant must give the insurer "as
soon as practicable . . . written proof of claim, under oath if

required."'127 Assuming that he has given reasonable notice, the
question remains as to how long the insured may delay before
forcing the insurer to arbitrate.
The insurers insisted, and a few writers agreed,' 2 that the
statute of limitations applicable to torts should control. The
insurers' substantive arguments were the following. First, the
insurer's liability is based on the offending motorist's tort.
Secondly, the insured by failing to demand arbitration within the
time limited for tort claims could frustrate the insurer's right to
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 N.H. 373, 236 A.2d 490 (1967); Pattani v. Keystone Ins.
Co., 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967); North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137
S.E.2d 264 (1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277

(1964).
"I For statutory citations to 13 jurisdictions which, in 1967, had provisions rendering an
automobile .uninsured upon the insolvency of an offending motorist's insurer, see Widiss,
supra note 7, at 512, n.55. For a listing of 32 jurisdictions providing coverage in case of
insolvency, as of November 1968, see J. CORBLEY, supra note 7, at 38-42.
2. J. CORBLEY. supra note 7, at 10, 48.
22 American Insurance Association, Chart of Mandatory Uninsured Motorist Provisions
(Jan. 1969).
22

Standard Endorsement. VI. Additional Conditions. B. Proof of Claim; Medical Reports.

2 Kuvin, The Ejyect on Uninsured Motorist Proceedings of Statute of Limitations,

Survival of Acions Act. Wrongful Death Act. Subrogation Rights, 1962 INs. COUNSEL J,
127. 130: Open Forum Discussion, 1964 INs. CoUNslI. J. 608. 615-16; Pretzel, supra note

37, at 719. Schallert, supra notd 63, at 938.

Vol. 1969: 227]

LA CK OF INSURANCE

subrogation. If the claimant were to go to arbitration and recover
after the tort statute of limitations against the offending motorist
has run, the latter could simply plead the statute against the
unfortunate insurer subrogee. Thirdly, once the claim against the
uninsured motorist is time-barred, he is no longer "legally liable"
as the Endorsement requires and consequently the insurer is equally
rid of his liability." 9
Given the "voluntary" background of the Endorsement, 3"
however, and the insistence of the insurers elsewhere on its
"contractual" terms, it would seem reasonable to treat the claim to
arbitration as contractual even though it does arise in the wake of a
tort committed by another. As to the asserted frustration of the
subrogation claims, it is within the control of the insurer to force a
passive claimant to proceed to arbitration. After all, the insurer has
been notified of the accident and thus has had the opportunity to
safeguard its rights to subrogation if that be considered worthwhile.
This, however, is rarely the case. Whatever subrogation may
amount to in other contexts, as against uninsured motorists it is a
mirage. For example, New York's MVAIC recovered until the end
of 1967 2.6 cents for each dollar it paid out. 3 ' In any event, the
argument that the insurer is no longer liable because a tortfeasor
able to plead the tort statute of limitations is not "legally
liable" to compensate his victim misconceives the basic idea
underlying the Endorsement. As might have been expected, the
insureds seek to rely on the contractual nature of the insurer's
obligation since the statute for contract actions is usually much
longer than the tort statute of limitations. Indeed it might have
been argued, at least in those jurisdictions which like New York
force the Endorsement by statute on all motorists, that the duty to
arbitrate is in substance of statutory origin and thus the limitation
established for statutory obligations should control.
This issue too became embroiled in much litigation. 3 2 In New
22
22

For a detailed critique, see Widiss, supra note 7, at 508-1I.
See note 9 supra.

' The total paid to claimants by the MVAIC from January I, 1959 to December 31. 1967
was $35.5 million; total subrogation recovery was $735,400. MVAIC, ANN. REP. OF THE
SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 17, 1968, Schedules F& H (mimeo).
131The question has been raised why the draftsmen of the Endorsement did not promptly

lay the issue to rest by amending the Endorsement to suit their desire for a shorter period.
Pretzel, supra note 37, at 719.
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York alone it took eight years and numerous lower court decisions
in favor of the contract statute of limitations'3 before the Court of
Appeals in a closely divided opinion opted in favor of the view of
the lower courts.Iu
Claims of a Victim's Survivors
The catalog of restrictive postures assumed by insurers under

the Endorsement is much longer than the foregoing illustrations
indicate.' m One final example deserves notice if only because it
almost caricatures the industry's attitude toward the Endorsement.
Following the suggestion of a frequent contributor to insurance law
journals' who was supported by others,'37 some insurers claimed
that if the accident killed the victim the Endorsement precluded any
claims by his dependents based on the applicable wrongful death
act. This argument proceeded from the phrase that the damages are
payable "to the insured or his legal representative."'' This, it was
said, solely contemplated claims by the victim and claims which
survived to his estate if he died, and which thus could be asserted
'"See, e.g., MVAIC v. McDonnell, 23 App. Div. 2d 773, 258 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1965);
McNamara v. MVAIC, 42 Misc. 2d 923, 248 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1964); McGuinness
v. MVAIC, 40 Misc. 2d 775, 243 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1963); La Marsh v. Md. Cas. Co.,
35 Misc. 2d 641, 231 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Ceccarelli, 204 N.Y.S.2d 550
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
1 De Luca v. MVAIC, 17 N.Y.2d 76, 215 N.E.2d 482, 268 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1966); accord
Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. App. 1963); Schlcif v.
Hardware Dealer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 489, 404 S.W.2d 490 (1966); Home v.
Superior Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962). In Louisiana, the lower courts
appear to be in conflict. 42 TUL. L. REv., supra note 101, at 356. In California, a special one
year statute of limitations enacted in 1959 sanctions the industry's position. CALW. INS.
CODE § 11580.2(b) (1959).
11 Among the restrictive positions taken by insurers under the Endorsement are the
provisions barring an insured's claim if, without the insurer's written consent, he settles with
(or, under many Endorsements other than the 1966 Standard Endorsement, prosecutes to
judgment his.claim against) the uninsured motorist, note 56 supra; the requirement of
"physical contact" between the victim and the uninsured automobile, note 55 supra; the
insistence that this contact be "direct"; the exclusion of governmental and self-insured'
automobiles from the definition of "uninsured automobiles," note 54 supra, whether driven
within or outside the scope of employment or by a thief, the insistence (under Endorsements
other than the 1966 Standard Endorsement) that motorcycles cannot be considered as
covered by the term "uninsured automobile."
"I Kuvin, supra note 128, at 131-35; Open Forum Discussion, 1964 INs. COUNSEL J. 608,
616.
'
E.g., Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 1967 INS. COUNSEL J. 57, 60.
'
Standard Endorsement (1966).
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by his representative, nothing more; the Endorsement contract did
not contemplate as its wording indicates any claims which might be
asserted under a wrongful death act by the victim's surviving
spouse or next of kin. In other words, what was true at common
law before Lord Campbell's Act of 1846 is now claimed to be true
under the Endorsement. So far as the Endorsement-insurer is
concerned, it is more profitable if the victim is killed outright than
if he is merely scratched.13 9 At least seven different trial and
appellate court opinions considered and rejected this indefensible
interpretation . 4

IV. A

CRITIQUE

Two characteristic but distinct features of the Endorsement
have emerged from its terms and the massive body of case law that
has accumulated to date: first, the multiplicity of restrictions on
recovery, restrictions that are either expressed by the original
language or read into the document by narrow insurer-sponsored
interpretations; second, the Endorsement's propensity to breed
litigation, despite a seemingly broad compulsory arbitration clause.
However extensive Endorsement litigation may be, it must be kept
in mind that this is a mass instrument issued or renewed annually
for some 74 million policy holders 4 upon payment of a premium
that varies from a low of $1 in New Hampshire to a high of $8 in
California.' As is true of other accident litigation only a negligible
fraction of claims involving uninsured motorists ever reaches the
stage of litigation or even arbitration;' the vast majority either is
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 577-81 (3d ed. 1964).
I See MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lovins, 248 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Netherlands
Ins. Co. v. Moore, 190 So. 2d 191 (Fla. App. 1966); Davis v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 172 So. 2d 485 (Fla. App. 1965); Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d
616 (Fla. App. 1964), afJ'd, 172 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1965); Hall v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., Iowa -,
158 N.W.2d 107 (1968); Stems v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 510 (Mo.
App. 1966).
M'The estimated figure is arrived at by deducting some 8 million private cars registered in
Michigan, Maryland and North Dakota (the "nominal" defendant jurisdictions) from the
total of more than 83 million private passenger cars registered today. See for 1966 state
321

registration and totals, 1967
supra.

AUTOMOBILE FACTS

& FIGURES 18. For 1968 figures see note I

,n Hashmi, supra note 8, at 151-52 (1965 figures).

1UBetween I 1/2% and 4%of all Endorsement claims presented to insurers are reported to
reach the stage of an arbitration award. Aksen, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement, 1965 INs. L.J. 17, 25.
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settled informally or abandoned. Plainly the decision to settle or
give up is usually reached in the light of the judicial interpretation
of the Endorsement. As elsewhere few statistics illuminate the scene
of practice. Even so, it is apparent that in all too many instances the
victims of uninsured motorists have no protection or at best are
inadequately indemnified.'44
Limited and Discriminatory Protection
The array of restrictions which thwart claims for recovery could
have been justified, in part at least, in 1956 when the first nationwide standard Endorsement appeared. The draftsmen could have
argued that from. the industry's viewpoint the lack of actuarial and
practical experience called for the utmost caution since the
premium to be charged had to be moderate to be acceptable to the
respective legislatures. Even so the illustrations furnished above
show that some of the restrictions went beyond the needs of
prudence, to say nothing of justice. Furthermore, many of them
persist today after experience financially favorable to the insurers
appears to have accumulated." 5 These restrictions, the most
prominent of which are the "other insurance" clauses, insurers'
disclaimers and insolvencies, frustrate the very purpose for which
the Endorsement was said to be designed. Although a few have
been abandoned in certain jurisdictions since 1956, largely under
the impact of judicial criticism or legislative correction, reform in
general has proceeded at a snail's pace.
The most critical flaw,. however, is inherent in the very concept
of a "private" accident policy protecting a motorist against
another motorist's failure to insure. This is the omission of the
Endorsement to give any consideration whatsoever to a very
substantial proportion of traffic victims- pedestrians. As the
uninsured motorist's first victim is overlooked by the "financial
responsibility laws", so is the pedestrian victim by the Endorsement
unless he can bring himself within its protective reach by qualifying
as one of the "named insureds" or as spouses and relatives who share
I"An estimate of $450 million damages annually caused by uninsured motorists provides
an insurance writer with an additional argument for keeping the Endorsement limits low
since any rise would lead to increased costs of the Endorsement. Pretzel, Keeping Up-to.Date
on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 1968 INs. L.J. 865, 871 n.18.
" For a discussion of the MVAIC's experience see note 179 infra.
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their household. This is a discrimination against a group of our
population Which, due to rising longevity and the increase in urban
street congestion, is bound to grow. It is made up of the aged who
live by themselves or in institutions, of those of any age who are
too poor to maintain automobiles and of those who do not care to
be burdened with them in our traffic-choked cities. Yet pedestrians
for evident reasons generally suffer the most severe injuries in
traffic accidents.
Presently New York stands as the only Endorsement
jurisdiction which has faced up to this problem. There pedestrians
enjoy, within narrowly defined limits, protection against uninsured
motorists similar to that of other victims. The official records of
New York's MVAIC show that in the three years from 1962 to
1964 the percentage of compensated pedestrians represented on the
average about 27 percent of the compensated insured victims.
During that period payments made to these victims accounted for
more than one half of MVAIC's total payments to insured
claimants. 4 7 Even if corresponding nation-wide percentages are
lower than the New York figures indicate, the discriminatory
failure to protect victims who both physically and economically are
most vulnerable to accidents is serious enough in itself to
characterize the Endorsement as gravely deficient."4
The Arbitration Clause
The other characteristic
breed litigation, cannot
considering the arbitration
industry's thinking about

of the Endorsement, its propensity to
be fully appreciated without first
clause. The clause was central to the
the Endorsement as indicated by the

m See note 63 supra.
" From 1962 to 1964 the MVAIC settled with insured victims a total of 7037 claims,
claims paid to qualified victims numbered 1906; the MVAIC paid a total of $8,651,183 to

insured victims, while the "qualified"
SECRETARY & MANAGER,

received $4,500,102. MVAIC, ANN.

REP. OF THE

May 21, 1965, Schedules I & K (mimeo).

M Twelve years ago, an advocate of the Endorsement shrugged off the problem of

inadequate protection by observing that "given time, the industry will produce an answer to
this gap.",Moser, supra note 36, at 721. According to Lemmon, Compulsory Insurance-A
Toxic Brew, 1956 INs. L.J. 695, in 1955 only 8 deaths and 93 serious injuries cases would

have remained unprotected in New York under a combination of public safety laws and the
-voluntary Endorsement. With the notable exception of Widiss, supra note 7, at 527-48, the
arbitration clause has received little critical attention.
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circumstances surrounding its adoption in 1956. At that time less
than half of the states had abandoned the common -law's wellknown dislike of arbitration. In a minority of jurisdictions express
statutory provisions had to be enacted to uphold even ordinary
agreements to arbitrate future disputes.149 These statutory changes
occurred against a background of long-established practices in the
field of commercial and labor arbitration where the parties involved
are more or less equal in economic and bargaining power and in
general have found this method of settling disputes more suitable to
their needs than litigation.
In contrast the Endorsement was intended to operate in a noncommercial context involving parties of totally disparate economic,
social and political power. It included arbitration as one of the
terms of a highly technical document drafted by the dominant
party. At best, and even when it was still being offered as "the
Voluntary Endorsement'"0 it was a .classic "take-it-or-leave-it"
contract. Today, however, it is frequently imposed by statutory
compulsion. 5' This is true in New York and Massachusetts for all
motorists; it is also true in at least nine other jurisdictions for
motorists whom the local "financial responsibility law" compels,
after their first accident, to obtain a liability policy and with it the
Endorsement. An intermediate situation exists in 34 other
jurisdictions where liability insurance is still sold on a voluntary
basis. 5 2 There the insured is given the right-of which few avail
themselves';-to reject the Endorsement which is "rolled-on," i.e.,
automatically appended to the liability policy unless the customer
rejects it.
In the face of these crucial differences from traditional forms
of arbitration and the fact that in 1956 even voluntary arbitration was far from being universally accepted, the insurance

" See Aksen, supra note 6,at 78-79; Notman, supra note 46, at 18-22; Widiss, supra note
7, at 528-32.
n'See note 40 supra.
"' The Endorsement is mandatory in Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia. See J.CoRBLEY,
supra note 7, at 38-41.

'" North Carolina occupies an intermediate position since liability insurance is compulsory
but the Endorsement may be rejected. See J.COR3LLY, supra note 7, at 40.
I Notman, supra note 46, at'7.
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industry propelled Endorsement arbitration on the national stageYss
In order to provide the organization and manpower necessary to
carry out the tens of thousands of arbitrations to be expected under
the terms of the Endorsement, the industry agreed to make annual
contributions to the American Arbitration Association through
assessments on insurers proportioned to their premium
incomesIss-to compensate the Association for its services. 56
In addition the Association charged insurers and insureds a fee
of $50 for each arbitration. Recently this arrangement was
abandoned for unexplained reasons. Instead the Association
now collects a $100 fee from the insurer and $50 from
the insured for each arbitration.1 57 Arbitrators receive no
remuneration. 5 8 In terms of income and caseload these
arrangements have profoundly affected the activities of the
Association. As statistics indicate its major preoccupation has
become the handling of Endorsement arbitration. In 1967 its
income from this activity was three times its income from labor
arbitration and two and one half times its income from commercial
arbitration.' Fees from the Endorsement now constitute 55 percent
of the Association's income, and in 1966 alone of about 13,000
cases handled 7,400 or almost 58 percent were uninsured motorist
arbitrationsi" Presumably with the spread of the Endorsement this
disparity of Endorsement and commercial and labor arbitrations
" ' a major transformation which occurred without any
will increase,16
"

As late as 1967, 16 jurisdictions are reported as barring arbitration under the

Endorsement. Donaldson, supra note 137, at 88. At least nine states specifically forbid
arbitration under the Endorsement. See J. CORELEY, supra note 7, at 42. One writer

concluded in 1967 that in 31 states the arbitration clause does not satisfy the statutory
requirements for an agreement or contract to arbitrate a future dispute and that in 17 of the
remaining 19 states the clause does not meet the statutory requirement for a voluntary
agreement. See Widiss, supra note 7, at 531, 532.
In Aksen, Arbitration of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Claims, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 589,
597 (1963).
I" Id. See also King, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Claims. 14 U. FLA. L. REV.

328, 344-45 (1962).
M Aksen, supra note 6, at 77.
"Id.
m See the balance sheet of December 31, 1967, in American Arbitration Association,
ARBrrRATiON NEWS

No. 3, March 1968.

American Arbitration Association, ARBrrRATION NEws No. 3, 1967, at 1.
' Aksen, supra note 6; Aksen, Arbitration of MVAIC Claims, An Analysis of the First
Five Years, 19 ARB. J. 164 (1964); Aksen, supra note 155; Aksen, supra note 143; Aksen,
"
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official explanation as if the Endorsement were simply another
welcome application of the idea of arbitration which needed little
discussion, let alone reflection.
Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding Endorsement
arbitration, few have questioned the clause on constitutional,
statutory or policy grounds.' It has been suggested that if the
usual approval of the Endorsement's arbitration provisions by a
state insurance commissioner be deemed "state action," then, if
compulsory, they may run afoul of the seventh amendment of the
Federal Constitution.1 13 More substantial, perhaps, are doubts based
on state constitutional guarantees of a jury trial.164 There is only one
pertinent precedent: enforced arbitration in Pennsylvania for
accident cases that do not exceed $2,000.1 51 Significantly the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the enabling statute on the
ground that the arbitration award could be set aside by a demand
for a jury trial. 6 No such opportunity, however, is provided by the
Endorsement; the arbitrator's decision is final.', 7 Nor for that matter
have plaintiffs so far challenged the validity of the arbitration clause
in the courts. 6 ' This is true even in New York where the MVAIC
without explicit statutory authority but with administrative
approval included the unusual clause in its Endorsement form." 9
The bar has joined in the observance of silence. That the
insurance counsel did so in this instance despite their general

-UninsuredMotorist Coverage: A Guide to MVAIC and Arbitration, 15

ARB.

J. (n.s.) 166

(1961).

"62But see Widiss, supra note 7, at 528-38; Note, The Problem of the Financially
Irresponsible Motorist-New York's MVAIC, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1082-85 (1965);
Note, Arbitration and Award, 78 HAIRv. L. REv. 1250, 1252-53 (1965).
2'7 78 HARV. L. REV. supra note 162, at 1252.
'"See generally Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small
Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 n.28 (1961).

Is For a cautious appraisal of Pennsylvania's limited experiment in forced arbitration, see
id.
I"In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wissler,
350 U.S. 858 (1955).

I" Of about 63,000 cases arbitrated, some 4000 were appealed between February 1958 and
December 1967. Statistical Report and Explanatory Remarks Pertaining to Compulsory
Arbitration-First Deade 1958-1967: County of Philadelphia. Compulsory Arbitration
Division, 1968 INS. L.J. 355, 362.
"But see Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157. 181 A.2d 634 (1932).
Its phrasing follows the statidard form. See J. CORBLEY, supra note 7, at 5I, 52,
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concern with the sanctity of jury trial may not be surprising.1 70
However, even the plaintiffs' bar organization has had nothing to
say. One might have thought that the right to a civil jury so
vigorously and at times stridently espoused by that bar seems
worthy of defense even if the recovery is limited to $10,000.
Moreover, not only is the jury dispensed with, but a lawyerarbitrator in contrast to a judge sitting without a jury has the final,
unappealable say. Lastly, a precedent is being firmly established
whose extension to other accident litigation and higher recovery
71
limits will not be so easily resisted.
Of course compelled arbitration under the Endorsement is
usually defended by its advocates on the grounds of speed,
informality, low cost and the need for preserving amicable relations
between insurer and insured. 72 Yet the narrow interpretation given
the clause spawns multiple litigation with the attendant procedural
complexities and increased expenses. As a consequence of the
application of this clause in*practice the parties to the Endorsement
often find themselves in conflicting strategic positions. The victim's
sole concern of course is to collect on his asserted claim as quickly
and as cheaply as possible, an advantage which arbitration was
supposed to provide. Nevertheless, the complainants will find
arbitration unavailable whenever the insurer can present any of the
multiple issues of fact and law noted above to a court.
On the other hand the insurer's position is more complex.
Obviously it will always resist what it deems to be an unjustified
claim. Although in the routine case arbitration may represent to
the insurer a net saving in time, effort and cost, in more unique
cases the insurer may well prefer to litigate because of the
significance of the outcome for the thousands of other cases under
the Endorsement it and other insurers may face in the future. The
,70The public relations director of a national organization of insurance counsel, in urging
the preservation of the jury trial, fails to mention compulsory arbitration under the
Endorsement. He refers, however, with approval to lawyer-staffed pre-trial panels in New
York as a device for securing settlements in personal injury and property damage cases
involving claims of $10,000 or less but stresses that these panels "will not impose decisions."
D. Ross, TRIAL BY JURY-PRESERVE IT 8 (1965).
"' One writer, relying heavily on Endorsement experience advocates voluntary arbitration
for automobile accident cases without urging "at least not at this time" compulsory
arbitration. See King, supra note 156, at 351.
In See, e.g., Aksen, supra note 6, at 76-78.
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natural consequence is the industry's aversion to the "broad" view
of the clause, a view which would sweep all legal issues into the noman's land of arbitration. While the "narrow view" restricting
arbitration to liability and damages is productive of multiple law
suits, the insurer may hope that litigation will produce an
authoritative, if not favorable interpretation of the law. But even
when a routine controversy enters the channel of arbitration, the
benefits are not equally shared. Doubtless the speed of arbitration
helps everybody. Most likely, however, the primary beneficiaries are
the attorneys on both sides and, to an undetermined extent, the
insurers. The attorneys are spared the effort and time normally
required to prepare the case and try it to a court and jury, and
where the insurance counsel passes on these savings to his corporate
client, the insurer also benefits. 173 In contrast, the claimant usually
will pay the established contingent fee.
One can only speculate as to whether arbitration provides more
"just" results.174 There are some indications that the insurers had
hoped that arbitrations would result in mori "reasonable" awards
than could be obtained from juries. 175 If it is in fact cheaper for
the industry to arbitrate than to go before a jury,' 7 it is again the
insured who is the loser. Perhaps independent fact research

In One writer estimates fees and costs in Endorsement arbitration as half the amounts
required for ordinary litigation. Pretzel, supra note 144, at 87 1.
"I "Arbitration ought to be more successful for the companies than for the claimants, as
more weapons are available to them than are available to the claimants" (referring to the
claimant's obligation to cooperate, to give a statement and to submit to a physical
examination, in contrast to the insurer's investigation, photographs, etc., which are not
available to the claimant). Pretzel, supra note 37, at 716.
113Arbitration figures in Michigan are said to show that 44% of arbitration cases go to a
final award as contrasted with 12% of jury cases filed. This is explained by the greater
readiness of the insurers to gamble on an arbitrator's award than on a jury verdict and to
take greater chances with arbitration because of the low ceiling. Pretzel, supra note 37, at
714.
,",The answer may depend on who acts as arbitrator. Of the arbitrators in 500 cases, 304
were plaintiffs' lawyers and only 57 defense lawyers; the average award by plaintiffs' lawyers
was 25% higher than those made by defense lawyers. Pretzel, supra note 144, at 871. Since
more plaintiffs' lawyers are available to serve as aribtrators, the American Arbitration
Association may have delicate problems of staffing. An insurance counsel observed:
"Arbitrating a case before an active plaintiff's [sic] attorney is like trying the case to a jury
made up of claimants' attorneys." Hapner, A Dozen Problems in Arbitration of Uninsured
Motorist Claims Under American ArbitrationAssociation Rules, 1967 INs. COUNS LJ. 92,
at 96.
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currently underway7 may provide the answer but for the moment
the truth is unknown.
Finally, in the light of the foregoing and of what is to be
discussed below it will not do to justify the arbitration clause by
pointing to the large number of cases which it keeps away from the
courts 1 The total of arbitrated cases is not a meaningful criterion
unless the number of claimants who abandon their actions in the
face of procedural roadblocks to arbitration and the number who
fail after an actual try to clear them are also known. Again the
annual reports of the MVAIC provide us with some clues. Thus it
appears for the 1962-1964 period less than 40 percent of the total
17
This high attrition rate after a
claims ever lead to any paymentY.
case has been docketed with the MVAIC cannot be explained
merely by precautionary filings, ineptitude of lawyers or their
readiness to pursue indefensible claims. Furthermore, it is not
known how many cases are abandoned without being docketed with
the MVAIC simply because filing seems futile.
Excessive Litigation
The rash of law suits over the terms of the Endorsement is
noteworthy; first, because it is insurance litigation of a peculiar
kind, and second, because its peculiarities tend to deter claimants
from pressing claims. It will not do to dismiss the current volume
of litigation as a passing phase, as "growing pains" that are after
all characteristic of any novel insurance policy."' In that view
insurers and insureds are always apt to litigate antagonistic
interpretations of standard policy terms until a congeries of
appellate opinions will settle the "law" in favor of one or the
other. The Endorsement is not to be compared with any of the
traditional forms of insurance such as life, fire, accident or liability
policies. These represent time-honored devices against universally

I" Columbia University Project for Effective Justice, School of Law, Columbia University.

For some preliminary findings, see Aksen, supra note 6, at 88-91.
171For statistics demonstrating the efficacy of arbitration in lessening docket loads, see.
e.g., Aksen, supra note 6, at 80-82.
"I During the 1962-64 period, some 17,900 arbitration cases were closed, only 7,037 of
which involved any payment. MVAIC, ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 21,

1965, Schedule K (mimeo).
19See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 7, at 501.
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recognized risks for which there is a correspondingly broad, social
need of protection. With respect to them, litigation over the
meaning of a particular provision will in the long run serve the
community which must rely on them. In contrast the Endorsement
not only defines an eminently marginal risk, but it is also a policy
for which there is no precedent in the United States or anywhere
else. Moreover, even when more than merely factual issues
are involved, appellate determinations in this area do not seem to
be peculiarly firm.""' While the draftsmen as it were have stolen a
march on many if not most legislatures in defining on their own the
terms of the Endorsement (which after all derives its coercive power
from an enabling statute) neither judicial nor legislative deference
to these industry-sponsored terms is likely to last. Indeed, as the
implications of the Endorsement unfold, judicial and legislative
"intervention" against its inequities seems to be increasing; the
effect of this development will be to rob the burgeoning body of
Endorsement case law of what limited stability it now has and by
the same token drain it of lasting legal and social significance. The
coming changes of course will add further fuel to the flames of
litigation.
These law suits differ from ordinary insurance litigation in
another important respect. Because of the unusual interplay
between arbitration and the judicial process noted above, many
lawyers, especially those appearing for the insured, and often
enough the courts themselves, seem baffled by the procedural and
jurisdictional difficulties in this relatively unfamiliar area. These
difficulties tend to shift the balance further to the disadvantage of
the insured who is rarely counselled by specialists. This is
particularly true if yet another typical feature of Endorsement
litigation is kept in mind: the usual optimal recovery of $10,000,82
from which a counsel fee of at least a third will be deducted.
There is something futile about complex forensic battles at the trial
and even more at the appellate levels when the rewards to the
" The number of reversals and divided appellate opinions in New York is a striking
illustration of the lack of firm precedent.
"I The maximum for single claims in Louisiana, Mississippi and Oklahoma, as of January
I, 1969, is $5000; in Alaska, California, Virginia and Washington $15,000; and in
Connecticut $20,000. American Insurance Association, Chart of Mandatory Uninsured

Motorist Provisions (Jan. 1969):
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claimant are so drastically limited. In contrast, with time, funds,
and, typically, superior experience in a new and specialized field of
law on its side, the insurer in all but the most routine cases has
little to lose and much to gain by litigation. Although this is true
of most insurance litigation, the problem assumes here a unique
intensity: the insured must deal with complex facts, face multiple
proceedings, deal with multiple parties (his own insurer, the
tortfeasor, the latter's insurer, police officials, motor vehicle
bureaus, etc.) and multiple instruments (his own and other
Endorsements, and if any, the tortfeasor's policy). Only where the
victim's losses near or exceed the $10,000 limit will his counsel be
ready to press his claim. These instances are the exception since the
average recovery is well below $2,000.'1 Difficulties such as these
are bound to produce the same effect as the many restrictions
embodied in the instrument itself: th6 assertion of claims is
discouraged.
The Endorsement, a Rewarding Venture for the Industry?
If, from the insured's vantage point, the foregoing observations
cast doubt on the Endorsement's capacity to fulfill adequately its
asserted purpose,"' the picture as seen from the insurers' side is
much brighter. In persuading within a decade 46 out of 50
legislatures"1 to induce, if not compel, all or most liability policy
holders to purchase the Endorsement, the industry has achieved a
brilliant legislative and strategic victory. In these 46 jurisdictions
the ghosts of compulsory insurance and of the "nominal
defendant", whether in the form of "unsatisfied judgment funds"
or otherwise, have been exorcised. To achieve this objective, the
industry was evidently prepared to pay a price. Its attitude was
recently explained to an academic observer:186
[lI]t can be said that the insurance industry is going to make
every effort to keep the premium . . . [for the Endorsement] as low
"IThe

average cost per claim paid by the MVAIC in 1967 to insured persons was $1856.

MVAIC, ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 17, 1968, Schedule H (mimeo).
I" "[Endorsement] coverage operates as a guarantee that a policyholder who has taken
steps to insure his liability . . . . and who is injured or damaged in an automobile accident,
shall be made financially whole." Deschamps, supra note 46.
legislation for 46 states, see
"' For statutory citations and other details of "Endorsement"
J. CoRBLEY, supra note 7.

I" Hashmi, supra note 8, at 158.
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as possible. [I]t was introduced primarily to provide an answer to
unsatisfied judgment funds and compulsory automobile liability
insurance and not to provide profit for the insuranceindustry.

The insurance industry does not want to overcharge for...
[the Endorsement]; in fact it would be glad to provide.

.

. [it] at a

break even point. (Emphasis added.)'

In fact, the Endorsement may turn out to be a profitable
venture. Reliable, if incomplete, statistics are available for New
York-the state which commands the longest and largest actuarial
experience with a mandatory, broadly-based Endorsement.
According to its annual reports, total expenditures of the MVAIC
during the calendar years 1962, 1963 and 1964 amounted to 19.1
million dollars.' During this three-year period, the New York
insurers collected, in Endorsement premiums, some 43.5 million
dollars.' s Hence, gross profits for the three year period amount to
about 24.4 million dollars. Even if another 30 percent'" is deducted
for commissions, taxes, overhead, etc., a net profit of about 17
million dollars remains. This amount may be contrasted with a
total of no more than 12.5 million dollars expended on behalf of
Endorsement-insureds' during the same period. Thus New York
insurers seemed a comfortable distance away from the break-even
point during that period. In appraising this result several basic
considerations must be entertained. First, the 1962-1964 period is
truly representative because by 1962, the existence and procedures
"' The viewpoint that the industry should merely break even is not shared by all. An insurance

counsel observed: "True enough, U.M. coverage costs and premiums are a small fraction of
total costs and premiums, but each coverage should make its own profit. Let's start with this
one!" Pretzel, supra note 37, at 720.
In Total disbursements of the MVAIC for 1962-1964 were $19,168,403.77. MVAIC, ANN.
REP. OF THE SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 17, 1963, May 22, 1964, May 21, 1965,
Schedule B (mimeo).
I

Automobile registrations for the period 1962-1964 were: 4.8 million in 1962, 4.9 million

in 1963, 5.1 million in 1964. Assuming that 2% of the registered cars were uninsured, a total
of about 14.5 million paid $3 each during this period. See AUToMOBILE FACTS & FIGURES
1964, 1965, 1966.

I"The figure used for liability insurance by the industry is actually 29. 1%. King, supra
note 3, at 1145. The sales (commission) costs for the Endorsement are lower than the 20%
assigned for liability policies so that the deduction should not exceed 25-26%.
"I The amounts actually paid out on behalf of Endorsement-insured for 1962-64 are 8.6
million, the balance of 4 million consists of allocated and unallocated (overhead) claims
expenses. MVAIC, ANN. REP. OF THE SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 17, 1963, May 22,
1964, May 21, 1965, Schedules I& K (mimeo).
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of the MVAIC, operative since January 1, 1958, had become
familiar to lawyers and public alike. Secondly, more than a third of
the total of 19.1 million dollars just noted, about 6.6 million, had
to be spent on the claims of pedestrian victims (the "qualified"
claimants) whom all other Endorsement jurisdictions ignore.
192
Hence, other jurisdictions with $3 (or higher) annual premiums
will show correspondingly higher profits. Furthermore, New York
insurers derived during that ,period about 14.5 million dollars in
additional premium income from New York motorists who each
pay another dollar for a special Endorsement to protect them solely
against out-of-state accidents with uninsured motorists, a coverage
that is not provided by the New York Endorsement.1 13 The amounts
expended to compensate insureds for such out-of-state accidents are
unknown, but it is not likely that the $1 "extraterritorial" rate is less
profitable than the $3 "domestic" rate. Finally, while New York's
experience is instructive, it is not fully representative since all New
York drivers must be insured and consequently the number of uninsured motorists and their victims should be smaller in New York " 4
than in jurisdictions operating under the regime of the "financial
responsibility laws." On the other hand, this factor will be substantially offset by the supposed "claim-consciousness" of New Yorkers,
by New York's attraction to motoring tourists, including uninsured
ones,"' by its higher costs, standards of living and levels of accident
compensation, and by the concentration of "uninsured" accidents in
New York City. Thus, far from requiring the industry to operate at
the suggested break-even point, the New York Endorsement has
been, at least during the 1962-1964 period, a source of comfortable

"n In 1965, the premium charged was less than $3 in 7 jurisdictions, $3 in 15 and more
than $3 in all other jurisdictions. Hashmi, supra note 8 at 151-52.
In New York Automobile Accident Indemnification Endorsement, Insuring Agreements,

I , Territory.
I" W.S. Hults, then Commissioner of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,

estimated in 1965 that there were only 6000 motorists in New York who deliberately evaded
the compulsory insurance law. No more recent estimates are available. Letter from Frank
Harwayne, Chief Actuary, Insurance Dept., State of New York, to the writer, January 29,
1968.

" In 1967, over 22%. of all claims paid by the MVAIC arose out of accidents involving
uninsured out-of-state driveLs. Another 18% involved unidentified hit-and-run drivers who
doubtless included a certain number of out-of-state drivers. MVAIC, ANN. REP. OF THE
SECRETARY & MANAGER, May 17, 1968, Schedule J (mimeo).
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profits. If this is the case elsewhere, the industry may well be able
to relax its restrictive stance at least until the break-even point is
reached.' Unfortunately, the economic aspects of the Endorsement
business have remained obscure, for the industry has not reported
its financial experience with the new device. The insurance professor
just quoted reports: "Many large insurers, for reasons of their own,
do not keep a separate record of. . . [Endorsement payments] or
. . . are unwilling to divulge them."' 97 However, limited data (for

the years 1960-1963) collected by two of the industry's three
statistical agencies' were "declassified and made available to him
only on condition that he would not present them in the form of a
table . . . [b]ecause it was feared that without an accompanying

explanation the data would be subject to great
misinterpretation."' 99 Furthermore, because of their "erratic
nature", he "agreed not to present [experience on a state-wide
basis] at all

. . .

and therefore an analytical study on [a] statewide

basis cannot be undertaken at this time."' m He notes, however, that
one trade group's nation-wide experience was "not particularly
good, while the other group's experience has been favorable." '0
Since the release of that information, five years (1964-1968) of
claims experience accompanied by the rapid nationwide expansion
of the compulsory or semi-compulsory feature of the Endorsement
have elapsed. The pertinent nation-wide data, it would appear, are
still unpublished and un-analyzed. Such data as are made available
use actuarial concepts that do not clarify the issue."0 The industry
defines payments to its insureds, the cost of handling individual
I" Contrast the comment of a writer, associated with the Industry in Illinois: "At the
present rates . . . [the Endorsement] is a real bargain. The full effect of the coverage will be
better known in 1968. We do know that if we wait until that time to learn about . . . fit], we
will have spent more dollars in payments than the claimants, your insureds, possibly deserved
. .. . [They] are just people, and because they are just ordinary folk, they consider an
insurance company, even their own carrier, as fair game." Pretzel, supra note 37, at 712.
Hashmi, supra note 8, at 156-57.
"'

The National Association of Independent Insurers and the National Bureau of Casualty

Underwriters, id. at 157.
nId. at 157 n.18.

Id. at 158 n.20.
21 Id. at 157.

2" The National Association of Independent Insurers has sent the author its statistical data
on a state-by-state basis for the years 1962-1967. A number of Insurance Commissioners
have also provided data on theif state's experience.
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claims (including insurance counsel fees) and overhead costs
attributable to these claims, as "losses. 2' 0 3 Its "loss ratio"
expresses the percentage of these outlays in terms of the premium
paid by the insured: for example, a loss ratio of 45 percent
indicates that the insurer paid out 45 cents in connection with
claims for each premium dollar collected. Yet, this ratio is not
computed on the basis of the amounts an insurer actually pays out
in a given year, i.e., "paid losses." These "paid losses" are
obviously critical figures on the balance sheet of every insurance
company. If they were compiled on a state-wide and eventually,
nation-wide basis, "paid losses" would tell us what it actually
costs, under the Endorsement regime, to compensate in a given year
the victims of uninsured motorists, clearly information of major
public interest. Yet, neither the industry nor their statistical
agencies, nor, for that matter, the insurance commissioners, seem
concerned with "paid losses."
Instead, the statistics made known are based on the concept of
"incurred losses"--the sum of the "paid losses" just discussed and
the estimated "losses" incurred as a result of Endorsement claims
filed against the insurer during a particular report year. °4 These
estimated losses are a more or less informed prophecy of what it
will cost the insurer to dispose of the claims filed during the year.
Whether these "incurred losses" are used to determine an insurer's
financial condition at a given time or to plan future premium rates,
the accuracy of this prediction cannot be determined without
information about "paid losses." However, as just noted, figures
on paid losses are not available to the public. This is a serious
deficiency because whatever experience may be available to test the
credibility of "incurred losses" in the liability field, it cannot be used,
without substantial qualification, in the Endorsement Context. Endorsement claims differ significantly from those based on the traditional liability policy both conceptually and technically. As pointed
out by the MVAIC's manager:
Experience has proven that the defense of an MVAIC case differs
materially in comparison with the defense of an automobile
liability case conducted by an insurance company. The unique
defenses available to the Corporation, which are in addition to
20

King, supra note 3, at 1144 n.37, 1145.

2"Id.

at 1144.
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liability defenses, are not usually applicable in the defense of a case
in behalf of an insurance carrier. These unique defenses mandate
that they be interposed in all litigation involving the Corporation.
For example, in a "hit-and-run" case it is a statutory
requirement that the accident be reported to the Police within
twenty-four hours of the occurrence and there must be actual
physical contact of the motor vehicle causing such bodily injury
with the claimant or with the motor vehicle which the claimant was
occupying at the time.
If these conditions precedent to recovery are not unequivocally
proven, the Corporation must demand a separate trial wherein it is
the claimant's burden to prove compliance with the statutory
requirements. 0 The difference between liability and Endorsement claims is
illustrated by the fact that, over the years, the MVAIC has been
able to close without payment at least 60 out of every 100 claims
filed against it, a record unmatched in the liability insurance field.
If this is true, one should like to know how "incurred losses"
under the Endorsement coverage are computed and how they
compare with actual losses, i.e., "paid losses." Not until these data
are known will it be possible to judge the financial aspects of the
Endorsement. Even if the severe restrictions presently imposed were
essential to avoid heavy losses or much higher premium changes,
this would simply suggest that the Endorsement is incapable of doing
its job.
CONCLUSION

The preceding examination of selected aspects of the
Endorsement has disclosed grave flaws in this novel device. These.
may be summarized as follows: (1) The Endorsement completely
ignores a large segment of pedestrian victims of uninsured
motorists-perhaps as many as one-third of the total-who are
unable to bring themselves under the umbrella of the standard
automobile liability policy to which the Endorsement is attached.
As a group the uninsured pedestrians suffer 40 percent of the total
bodily injuries caused by uninsured motorists. (2) The Endorsement
as designed "over"-protects the insurers and "under"-protects the
insured. Most of the recent improvements in this regard resulted
I MVAIC,

ANN. REP. OF THE SECRErARY & MANAGER, May

21, 1965, 9

(mimeo).
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from legislative and judicial intervention. (3) The Endorsement is
generally available only up to present liability insurance minimums,
$10,000 for a single claimant and $20,000 for multiple claims
arising out of the same accident. Thus compensation fails when it is
most urgently needed-whenever injuries are severe. (4) The Endorsement adds a defect of its own. While automobile liability insurance can be purchased in virtually unlimited amounts, insurers
generally have refused to write higher limits for higher premiums for
the Uninsured Motorist Coverage although in New York, for instance, at least seven years of broad statistical experience for this
risk have been available. (5) The compulsory arbitration prescribed
by the Endorsement doubtless provides a quick and inexpensive
remedy where the controversy is limited to the issues of fault and
damages. It remains a matter of conjecture as to whether the unappealable decision of a single lawyer, sitting as an arbitrator, provides more "justice" for either side. In routine cases, the chief beneficiaries of the reduction in effort and time due to arbitration appear
to be the attorneys on both sides. (6) The widespread interpretation
of the arbitration clause permitting only the questions of negligence,
contributory negligence and damages to be arbitrated, has enabled
the insurers, in numerous instances, to litigate many legal and factual
issues with their own policy-holders before arbitration can be enforced. (7) Confronted with conflicting notions about the Endorsement's purpose and the pertinent statutory provisions, the judiciary,
even within a single jurisdiction, appears uncertain about the proper
approach toward the novel instrument. The uncertainty is reflected
in frequent judicial disagreements, culminating in divided opinions
on all appellate levels. (8) The burgeoning case law of the
Endorsement seems legally and socially of minor significance
compared with the heavy burden it imposes on claimants, courts
and the taxpaying public. There is little hope for an ultimate
"clarification" of fundamental issues and concepts; what is
litigated are not the terms of a standard fire, life or liability policy
but of a highly marginal, odd and perhaps ephemeral accident
policy. Decades of further litigation, refueled from time to time by
the inevitable revision, by insurers, courts, or legislative action, of
the Endorsement's terms, lie ahead. (9) Whenever extensive
litigation seems likely, the insured's lawyer will hesitate to pursue
his client's claim unless it approaches the $10,000 limit. The game is
not worth the candle. (10) In contrast, the restrictive and litigious
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attitude of the insurers persists in the presence of evidence from New
York that the Endorsement has been a source of respectable
profits to the insurers.
Despite the present, serious upheaval in the insurance industry,
it is too much to expect that the Endorsement will vanish from the
American scene. The industry has devoted very substantial
legislative, organizational and litigious efforts to its
brainchild-efforts that will not be readily abandoned. Thus,
realistic hopes for improving the Endorsement lie with our
legislatures. Among needed reforms, none is more urgent than
elimination of its most mischievous feature, the discriminatory
disregard of pedestrians who do not qualify as Endorsement
insureds. Even if coverage of pedestrians is broadened, New York's
present experience raises serious doubts about the soundness of the
basic approach.
There is irony in all this. Although constituting only 1.6 percent
of the world's population, Americans own more than half of the
automobiles in use today. During the last fifty years, they have
transformed what was once a rich man's toy into an item of mass
consumption. Throughout this process they have paid and are
continuing to pay a heavy price; more than a million and a half
Americans have died since 1913 in automobile accidents. With such
wealth, know-how, and bitter experience at their command, the
American people deserve better protection against uninsured
motorists than the inadequate device of "uninsured motorist
insurance" affords.

